



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

October 23 – 24 | Santa Monica, CA

Welcome Remarks

Wednesday, October 23, 2019

2:00 p.m. – 2:05 p.m.

Speaker: Chip Jones
Senior Vice President
FINRA Member Relations and Education

Speaker Biography:

Chip Jones is Senior Vice President of Member Relations and Education for FINRA. In leading the Member Relations and Education Department, Mr. Jones' responsibilities include maintaining and enhancing open and effective dialog with FINRA member firms. Mr. Jones also oversees FINRA's Member Education area, which includes FINRA conferences and other member firm educational offerings such as the FINRA Institute at Georgetown for the Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional (CRCP)[®] designation. Prior to joining FINRA, Mr. Jones spent six years as Vice President of Regulatory and Industry Affairs at American Express Financial Advisors (AEFA). Previous to AEFA, he spent two years as Advocacy Administrator for the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). Mr. Jones was employed by the Virginia Securities Division as a senior examiner/investigator prior to joining AIMR.



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Welcome Remarks



Panelist

■ Speaker

- **Chip Jones, Senior Vice President, FINRA Member Relations and Education**



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Fireside Chat Featuring FINRA President and CEO Robert Cook, Executive Vice President of Member Supervision Bari Havlik and Senior Vice President of Member Relations and Education Chip Jones

Wednesday, October 23, 2019

2:05 p.m. – 2:45 p.m.

Speakers:

Robert Cook
President and Chief Executive Officer
FINRA

Bari Havlik
Executive Vice President, Member Supervision
FINRA Member Supervision

Chip Jones
Senior Vice President
FINRA Member Relations and Education

Fireside Chat Featuring FINRA President and CEO Robert Cook, Executive Vice President of Member Supervision Bari Havlik and Senior Vice President of Member Relations and Education Chip Jones Panelist Bios:

Speakers:

Robert W. Cook is President and CEO of FINRA, and Chairman of the FINRA Investor Education Foundation. From 2010 to 2013, Mr. Cook served as the Director of the Division of Trading and Markets of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Under his direction, the Division's professionals were responsible for regulatory policy and oversight with respect to broker-dealers, securities exchanges and markets, clearing agencies and FINRA. In addition, the Division reviewed and acted on over 2,000 rule filings and new product listings each year from self-regulatory organizations, including the securities exchanges and FINRA, and was responsible for implementing more than 30 major rulemaking actions and studies generated by the Dodd-Frank and JOBS Acts. He also directed the staff's review of equity market structure. Immediately prior to joining FINRA, and before his service at the SEC, Mr. Cook was a partner based in the Washington, DC, office of an international law firm. His practice focused on the regulation of securities markets and market intermediaries, including securities firms, exchanges, alternative trading systems and clearing agencies. During his years of private practice, Mr. Cook worked extensively on broker-dealer regulation, advising large and small firms on a wide range of compliance matters. Mr. Cook earned his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1992, a Master of Science in Industrial Relations and Personnel Management from the London School of Economics in 1989, and an A.B. in Social Studies from Harvard College in 1988.

Bari Havlik is Executive Vice President for Member Supervision. In this capacity, Ms. Havlik leads FINRA's Member Regulation program, which includes surveillance and examination programs for member firms. Previously, Ms. Havlik was a Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer for The Charles Schwab Corporation. She began her career in financial services in 1982, and has worked for discount brokerage, full service retail and institutional securities firms, as well as bank-affiliated broker-dealers. Ms. Havlik received her undergraduate degree from DePaul University. She serves on the board of Creativity Explored, a non-profit that gives artists with developmental disabilities the means to create and share their work with the community, celebrating the power of art to change lives. Before relocating to New York, she also served on the board of GirlVentures, a non-profit that inspires girls to lead through outdoor adventure, inner discovery and collective action.

Chip Jones is Senior Vice President of Member Relations and Education for FINRA. In leading the Member Relations and Education Department, Mr. Jones' responsibilities include maintaining and enhancing open and effective dialog with FINRA member firms. Mr. Jones also oversees FINRA's Member Education area, which includes FINRA conferences and other member firm educational offerings such as the FINRA Institute at Georgetown for the Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional (CRCP)[®] designation. Prior to joining FINRA, Mr. Jones spent six years as Vice President of Regulatory and Industry Affairs at American Express Financial Advisors (AEFA). Previous to AEFA, he spent two years as Advocacy Administrator for the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). Mr. Jones was employed by the Virginia Securities Division as a senior examiner/investigator prior to joining AIMR.



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**Fireside Chat Featuring FINRA President and CEO
Robert Cook, Executive Vice President of Member
Supervision Bari Havlik and Senior Vice President of
Member Relations and Education Chip Jones**



Speakers

■ Speakers

- **Robert Cook, President and Chief Executive Officer, FINRA**
- **Bari Havlik, Executive Vice President, Member Supervision, FINRA Member Supervision**
- **Chip Jones, Senior Vice President, FINRA Member Relations and Education**



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Regulation Best Interest **Wednesday, October 23, 2019** **3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.**

Panelists discuss key issues regarding the SEC's Regulation Best Interest Rule. Panelists provide practical advice on how firms and registered representatives can better understand customers and securities in order to prepare for the SEC's Regulation Best Interest Rule.

Moderator: James Wrona
Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Regulatory
FINRA Office of General Counsel

Speakers: Lourdes Gonzalez
Assistant Chief Counsel – Sales Practice, Division of Trading and Markets
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Wendy Lanton
Chief Operations and Compliance Officer
Lantern Investments, Inc.

Lisa Roth
President
Tessera Capital Partners, LLC

Regulation Best Interest Panelist Bios:

Moderator:

James S. Wrona is Vice President and Associate General Counsel for FINRA in Washington, DC. In this role, he is responsible for various policy initiatives, rule changes and litigation regarding the securities industry. Mr. Wrona formerly was associated with the law firm of K&L Gates LLP, where his practice focused on complex federal litigation. He also previously served as a federal law clerk for the Honorable A. Andrew Hauk of the United States District Court for the Central District of California (Los Angeles). Mr. Wrona is a frequent speaker at securities and litigation conferences and author of numerous law review articles, including *The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework for Enhanced Investor Protection*, 68 Bus. Law. 1 (Nov. 2012); *The Securities Industry and the Internet: A Suitable Match?*, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 601 (2001).

Speakers:

Lourdes Gonzalez is Assistant Chief Counsel for Sales Practices in the Division of Trading and Markets at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Office of Chief Counsel has program responsibility for a broad range of broker-dealer issues, including broker-dealer registration, sales practices, supervision, securities arbitration, and anti-money laundering compliance. She is a frequent speaker on these topics, and has represented the Commission both nationally and internationally. In addition, Ms. Gonzalez is the Commission's representative to the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group and she oversees the Commission staff's participation in the Financial Action Task Force. Prior to joining the Commission, Ms. Gonzalez worked at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. She earned her law degree from George Washington University and her undergraduate degree from Georgetown University.

Wendy Lanton has been in the financial services industry for more than 25 years. She is one of the founding principals of Lantern Investments, a FINRA registered broker dealer, and Lantern Wealth Advisors, an SEC registered investment advisor. She has been the Chief Compliance Officer of Lantern Investments since its inception in 1993. The firm has multiple business lines and currently has 42 registered representatives and operates 13 branch offices across the country. Ms. Lanton is responsible for both the firm's compliance and the day-to-day operations. In December 2015 she was appointed to the FINRA Small Firm Advisory Committee and served as the committee's chairperson in 2018. She also currently serves on the Steering Committee for her firm's current clearing firm and was the co-chairperson on the steering committee at her previous clearing firm. As a steering committee member, her industry experience is called upon to help direct both compliance and technology resources. Ms. Lanton has also served as the chairperson for multiple Compliance Forums for retail brokerage firms. She is a frequent panelist/speaker at FINRA conferences. Her industry perspective is called upon to discuss topics such as Anti-Money Laundering, Top Regulatory Concerns and Effective Risk Based Examinations. In February 2016, Ms. Lanton served as a panelist representing small firms at the Cybersecurity Conference. She has written numerous compliance-centric articles focusing on topics ranging from client suitability to cyber-security. Ms. Lanton graduated from George Washington University where she majored in International Finance.

Lisa Roth is the president of Monahan & Roth, LLC, a professional consulting firm offering compliance guidance, expert witness and related services on financial and investment services topics including securities and financial services industry compliance, investment product due diligence, investor suitability, management and supervision, information security and related topics. Ms. Roth is also the President, AML Compliance Officer and Chief Information Security Officer of Tessera Capital Partners. Tessera is a limited purpose broker dealer offering new business development, financial intermediary relations, client services and marketing support to investment managers and financial services firms. Ms. Roth holds FINRA Series 7, 24, 53, 4, 65, 99 Licenses, and has served in various executive capacities with Keystone Capital Corporation, Royal Alliance Associates, First Affiliated (now Allied) Securities, and other brokerage and advisory firms. In 2003, Ms. Roth founded ComplianceMAX Financial Corp. acquired by NRS in 2007), a regulatory compliance company offering technology and consulting services to more than 1000 broker-dealers and investment advisers. Ms. Roth's leadership at ComplianceMAX led to the development of revolutionary audit and compliance workflow technologies now in use by some of the United States' largest (and smallest) broker-dealers, investment advisors and other financial services companies. Ms. Roth has been engaged as an expert witness on more than 100 occasions, including FINRA, JAMS and AAA

arbitrations, Superior Court and other litigations, providing research, analysis, expert reports, damages calculations and/or testimony at deposition, hearing and trial. Ms. Roth is a member of FINRA DR's National Arbitration and Mediation Committee, and FINRA's Series 14 Item Writing Committee. Ms. Roth was unanimously selected by her peers to serve as the Chairman of FINRA's Small Firm Advisory Board for one of a total of four years of service on the Board from 2008-2012. She has also served as a member of the PCAOB Standing Advisory Group, and is an active participant in other industry forums, including speaking engagements and trade associations. Ms. Roth resides in CA, but is a native of Pennsylvania, where she attained a Bachelors of Arts Degree and was awarded the History Prize from Moravian College in Bethlehem, PA.



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Regulation Best Interest



Panelists

■ Moderator

- **James Wrona, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Regulatory, FINRA Office of General Counsel**

■ Panelists

- **Lourdes Gonzalez, Assistant Chief Counsel – Sales Practice, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)**
- **Wendy Lanton, Chief Operations and Compliance Officer, Lantern Investments, Inc.**
- **Lisa Roth, President, Tessera Capital Partners, LLC**



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Resources

Regulation Best Interest Resources

- Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV (September 2019)
www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/form-crs-relationship-summary
- Regulation Best Interest – A Small Entity Compliance Guide (September 2019)
www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/regulation-best-interest
- Reg BI and Form CRS Firm Checklist
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/reg-bi-checklist.pdf



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Transformation of FINRA's Examination and Risk Monitoring Program

Wednesday, October 23, 2019

4:15 p.m. – 5:15 p.m.

During this session, FINRA staff will discuss the new firm grouping structure, the status of changes and what small firms can expect going forward.

Moderator: Colleen Diles
Surveillance Director, Sales Practice
FINRA Los Angeles District Office

Speakers: Jeff Aelmore
Surveillance Director, Sales Practice
FINRA Denver District Office

Anna Garabedi
Associate Principal Business Analyst, Member Supervision, Program Management
Office
FINRA Member Supervision

Jennifer Luginbill
Associate District Director, Sales Practice
FINRA Kansas City District Office

Transformation of FINRA's Examination and Risk Monitoring Program Panelist Bios:

Moderator:

Colleen Diles is Surveillance Director for the Los Angeles District Office of FINRA. Ms. Diles oversees the District Office risk-monitoring program, which is responsible for identifying and addressing current and emerging risks at member firms and within the industry. She has been instrumental in the evolution of the risk-monitoring program over the years and is involved in the current transformation efforts at FINRA, working on various national initiatives that will shape the risk monitoring and examination programs going forward. Ms. Diles has 23 years of securities industry experience, including 19 years in securities regulation. Prior to her current role as Surveillance Director, Ms. Diles was an Examination Manager in the Los Angeles District Office. Prior to joining FINRA, Ms. Diles was a Mutual Fund Administration Supervisor at Chase Global Fund Service Company in Boston, Massachusetts. Ms. Diles earned a Bachelor of Science with a concentration in Accounting from Merrimack College, and she completed the Excellence in Management Program at Wharton School of Business.

Speakers:

Jeff Aelmore is the surveillance director of the Denver District office of FINRA with more than 10 years of experience in examination roles. He currently manages a team of Regulatory Coordinators and is responsible for risk assessment, financial, operational and sales practice surveillance for approximately 200 broker-dealers. Mr. Aelmore was previously an examiner for FINRA in the Dallas District office from 2005 through 2010 and was an Examination Manager in the Seattle District office from 2010 through 2015. Mr. Aelmore is a Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional™ (CRCP™) from the FINRA Institute at the Wharton School of Business and is a graduate from Kansas State University with a bachelor's degree in finance and a minor in economics.

Anna Garabedi is Associate Principal Business Analyst at FINRA. In this past year, she oversaw a team of national staff members across business lines for the transformation that determined the future organizational framework of Member Supervision for the Risk Monitoring and Examination Programs. Ms. Garabedi joined FINRA in 2017 as a Senior Examiner in Sales Practice. Prior to joining FINRA, Ms. Garabedi spent a significant portion of her career at Barclays, where she served as the primary business liaison between front office and technology; in that role, she defined the strategic roadmap for regulatory projects in fixed-income institutional sales and investment banking divisions. Ms. Garabedi started her career in Wealth Management at Smith Barney Morgan Stanley. She also served in the honors program for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in OCIE (Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations) and as a Legal Extern for FINRA Enforcement. Ms. Garabedi earned her J.D. degree from Pepperdine School of Law, with a Certificate in Alternative Dispute Resolution from the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, and a high-honors Bachelors of Science undergraduate degree in Finance from Rutgers Business School.

Jennifer Anne Luginbill is Associate District Director of FINRA's Kansas City District Office where she oversees the planning and execution of the Kansas City District Office's firm exam program and is responsible for guiding staff in the execution of exams and investigation of regulatory issues. Ms. Luginbill began her career with NASD in 2000 as a Compliance Examiner conducting routine examinations of member firms and completing cause related investigations. Prior to joining NASD/FINRA, Ms. Luginbill obtained banking and securities experience while employed at a couple of broker-dealers in several different capacities including Registered Representative and Compliance Manager. In addition, Ms. Luginbill was employed as a Compliance Examiner for the Kansas Securities Commissioner's Office where she was responsible for reviewing both Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers for regulatory compliance. She holds a B.S. in Business Administration from Drake University and obtained the Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional™ (CRCP™) designation from the FINRA Institute at Wharton in 2008.



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Transformation of FINRA's Examination and Risk Monitoring Program



Panelists

■ Moderator

- Colleen Diles, Surveillance Director, Sales Practice, FINRA Los Angeles District Office

■ Panelists

- Jeff Aelmore, Surveillance Director, Sales Practice, FINRA Denver District Office
- Anna Garabedi, Associate Principal Business Analyst, Member Supervision, Program Management Office, FINRA Member Supervision
- Jennifer Luginbill, Associate District Director, Sales Practice, FINRA Kansas City District Office

Firm Groupings


Retail

**Capital
Markets and
Investment
Banking**

**Trading and
Execution**

**Clearing/
Carrying**

Diversified



FINRA Transformation: Organization Structure

- Key points of the new frameworks structure
- Decision-making factors and considerations in selecting the new frameworks structure
- How the new structure will affect member firms

FINRA Transformation

- **Staffing**
- **Process**
- **Preliminary Findings Pilot**



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

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Cybersecurity Guidance for Small Firms

Thursday, October 24, 2019

9:00 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.

It is crucial that small financial firms take proper cybersecurity measures to protect their customers and their firm. During this session, panelists provide risk-based, threat-informed effective practices applicable to small firms and supportive of their overall business model to increase their security and ensure the protection of their customers.

Moderator: David Kelley
Surveillance Director, Sales Practice
FINRA Kansas City District Office

Speakers: Kevin Bogue
Regulatory Principal, Sales Practice
FINRA Chicago District Office

Wyatt Hamilton
Chief Information Security Officer
Peak Brokerage Services, LLC

Jennifer Szaro
Chief Compliance Officer
Lara, May & Associates, LLC

Cybersecurity Guidance for Small Firms Panelist Bios:

Moderator:

Dave Kelley is Surveillance Director based out of FINRA's Kansas City District office, and has been with FINRA for over eight years. Mr. Kelley also leads FINRA's Sales Practice exam program for cybersecurity and the Regulatory Specialist team for Cyber Security, IT Controls and Privacy. Prior to joining FINRA, he worked for more than 19 years at American Century Investments in various positions, including Chief Privacy Officer, Director of IT Audit and Director of Electronic Commerce Controls. He led the development of website controls, including customer application security, ethical hacking programs and application controls. Mr. Kelley is a CPA and Certified Internal Auditor, and previously held the Series 7 and 24 licenses.

Speakers:

Kevin Bogue joined FINRA in January 2017 as a Regulatory Principal in the Chicago District Office. Mr. Bogue is a member of the Sales Practice Cybersecurity team responsible for examining firms' controls over their protection of sensitive client and firm information. Prior to joining FINRA, Mr. Bogue has more than 17 years of information technology (IT) and security experience working as a technology consultant with Accenture, as an internal Global IT auditor, IT Compliance Manager and SOX Program Manager with Abbott Laboratories, as an IT Compliance Manager with Brunswick and as an internal IT Audit Manager with CDW. Mr. Bogue earned an MS in Information Systems from DePaul University in Chicago, IL and a BS in Psychology from Iowa State University in Ames, IA.

Jennifer Szaro is Chief Compliance Officer for Lara, May & Associates, LLC ("LMA") a fully disclosed introducing broker/dealer and XML Financial Group, an independent wealth management firm an affiliate of LMA. Ms. Szaro is responsible for managing both firms' compliance infrastructures. Ms. Szaro joined the securities industry in 2000. She previously worked in the internet technology sector where she had experience in ecommerce, hosting and product development. As the securities industry went through significant changes with higher regulatory demands she took on more compliance and marketing related roles. In 2011, she became a senior level executive and LMA's Chief Compliance Officer. In addition to her role as the Chief Compliance Officer, she is a Financial Operations Principal (FINOP) and obtained the following FINRA registrations: 6, 7, 14, 24, 28, 53, 63, 65 and 99. In 2012, she completed FINRA's Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional Program (CRCP)[®] previously through the FINRA Institute at Wharton. In 2018, she became a non-public FINRA Dispute Resolution Arbitrator, having qualified through the National Arbitration and Mediation Committee. In 2019, she was appointed by FINRA to serve out a two-year term on the Small Firm Advisory Committee (SFAC). Ms. Szaro is a graduate from the University of Rhode Island with a Bachelor of Science.



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Cybersecurity Guidance for Small Firms



Panelists

■ Moderator

- **David Kelley, Surveillance Director, Sales Practice, FINRA Kansas City District Office**

■ Panelists

- **Kevin Bogue, Regulatory Principal, Sales Practice, FINRA Chicago District Office**
- **Wyatt Hamilton, Chief Information Security Officer, Peak Brokerage Services, LLC**
- **Jennifer Szaro, Chief Compliance Officer, Lara, May & Associates, LLC**

To Access Polling

- Under the “Schedule” icon on the home screen,
- Select the day,
- Choose the Cybersecurity Guidance for Small Firms session,
- Click on the polling icon: 

Topics

- Incidents Occurring at Small Firms
- Incident Response
- Training and Awareness
- Branch Cybersecurity Controls
- Outsourced IT Resources
- Email Security
- References

Polling Question 1

- 1. Does your firm have a formal incident response plan?**
 - a. Yes, We are testing at least annually**
 - b. Yes, We have not tested the plan yet**
 - c. No**

Incidents Occurring at Small Firms

- **Phishing Emails**
- **Email Account Compromise / Takeover**
- **Fraudulent Wires**
- **Imposter Websites**
- **Ransomware**
- **Malware**
- **Trusted vendor data breach**

Most successful attacks in 2018 against FINRA firms were account takeovers at the client and RR level often resulting in fraudulent wires and data breaches

Incident Response Plans

- **Key information to include in an incident response plan would include:**
 - **Scope**
 - **Definition of Key Terminology (e.g., Asset, Event, Incident)**
 - **Incident Response Team** (Department Managers, Compliance, Info Security, Legal, Communications, External Partners)
 - **Types of Incidents (e.g., Email Account Takeover, Ransomware)**
 - **Classification of a Potential Incident (e.g., High, Medium, Low)**
 - **Response**
 - **Recovery**
 - **Communications to Customers, Regulators, FBI, States**
 - **Post-mortem/Lessons Learned**
 - **Periodic Testing and Remediation (e.g., Tabletop Exercise)**

Incident Response Testing

■ Tabletop Exercise:

- **Definition**

- Tabletop exercises enable organizations to analyze potential emergency situations in an informal environment, and are designed to foster constructive discussions among participants as they examine existing operational plans and determine where they can make improvements.*

- **Testing Tips**

- Prepare for the exercise (e.g., review Incident Response Plan)
- Involve multiple parties from throughout the organization (e.g., Cyber, Legal, Communications, Compliance, Department Managers)
- Explain the ground rules of the exercise / develop a clear scope
- Leverage resources from industry and/or the government (e.g., FS-ISAC)
- Broader can be better (i.e., detection of incident through public disclosure)
- Make the scenario as realistic as possible (e.g., invite SMEs to assist in planning)

*Source: <https://www.csoonline.com/article/2838365/planning-for-a-security-emergency-from-the-tabletop-down.html>

Incident Response Observations

- Plans are not formalized or comprehensive.
- Incidents are not being logged/documented/tracked.
- Owners are not assigned to remediate incidents.
- Incidents are not being categorized, prioritized and remediated based on risk (likelihood and impact).
- Scenarios not established for various types of incidents.
- Contact and escalation lists are not established and/or retainers are not in place for critical third parties (e.g., managed service providers, legal counsel).
- Plans are not tested periodically or at all (e.g., table top exercises).

Polling Question 2

- 2. Does your firm train staff and reps/advisors on how to identify phishing emails?**
- a. Yes – Advisors and Home Office Staff**
 - b. Yes – Home Office Staff only**
 - c. No**

Training and Awareness

- **The protection of confidential firm and customer data is everyone's responsibility.**
- **Training should:**
 - Include employees, advisors, contractors and customers
 - Include cyber threats such as phishing examples (attachments, links, etc.), privacy responsibilities and information handling
 - Employ a formal annual training and certification program
 - Ensure appropriate funding for training including peoples' time and tools
- **Addressing different learning styles is found to be effective:**
 - Classroom and online self-study (internally and/or externally developed)
 - Lunch-and-learns and informal roadshows
 - Periodic testing to raise awareness:
 - Staged phishing emails, bad links, or “lost” flash drives delivering instructive messages

Branch Cybersecurity Controls

■ Basic Controls: Based on Business Model & Types of Branch Offices

- Branch Policies / Procedures
- Training (including new representative orientation)
- Asset Inventory / Data Storage
- Verification of Compliance at Branch level with Cyber Policies (Automation / Field Inspections / Branch Audits)
- Technical Controls – Encryption, Virus Protection, Patching, Network Controls etc.
- Access Controls (Passwords, Multifactor Authentication)
- Mobile Devices – Endpoint Management
- Communication Issues (Email, Skype, TEAMS, Bloomberg, WhatsApp, Text, etc.)
- Vendor Management including the use of Cloud (e.g., storage, backups)
- Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery

Working With Outsourced IT Resources

■ Effective Practices:

- **Initial Due Diligence**
 - Security and IT Vendors
 - Well Versed in the Financial Services Industry
 - SOC Reports
 - IT Vendors identifying topics for firm consideration
- **Qualifications and Standards**
 - FINRA's Vendor List
 - Contractual obligations
 - Cybersecurity Insurance Policy Requirements
- **Use of the Cloud**

Polling Question 3

- 3. Is your firm using a Cloud hosted email solution (e.g., O365, G-Suites)?**
- a. Yes**
 - b. No**
 - c. Don't Know**

Email Security

■ Basic Email Controls and Effective Practices:

- User Training – users need to know how to identify phishing attacks.
- Multi-Factor Authentication when logging into email accounts.
- Use of email encryption and data loss prevention (DLP) tools.
- Protection against imposter or spoofing emails.
- Severity Alerts
 - Auto-forwarding rules
- Mobile Device Management (Microsoft Intune for O365)

■ FINRA Notification: www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/information-notice-100219

References

- **FINRA's Cybersecurity Page** (www.finra.org/industry/cybersecurity)
 - Small Firm Cybersecurity Checklist
 - Core Cybersecurity Controls for Small Firms
 - Report on Selected Cybersecurity Practices – February 2018
 - Report on Cybersecurity Practices – December 2015
 - FINRA Imposter Website Alert (www.finra.org/industry/information-notice-042919)
 - Fraudulent Phishing Emails Targeting Member Firms www.finra.org/node/87906
 - Compliance Vendor Directory (www.finra.org/compliance-tools/compliance-vendor-directory)

- **Peer 2 Peer Compliance Library** - www.finra.org/compliance-tools/peer-2-peer-compliance-library

- **Non-FINRA Resources Listing** (www.finra.org/industry/non-finra-cybersecurity-resources)

[c o m p a n y n a m e]
C Y B E R I N C I D E N T
[d a t e] T A B L E T O P E X E R C I S E

SCENARIO *(present to group in exercise)*

“An employee clicked on a link in a phishing email that triggered a ransomware notice. Our IT provider was made aware of it and they are investigating the situation. However, our company network is disabled and access is locked down. Access to the company email and Outlook contacts on our personal devices is also disabled. What do we do now?”

Attendees in exercise (name & title): _____

Code word for incident (use in all correspondence): _____

Steps to Consider:

Identification – What happened, what is the issue?

Invoke the incident response plan and incident response team – Is the plan available, who is on the team?

Escalate to management.

Investigation – who can help our IT service provider and us?

Identification of what data was affected (client NPI, firm sensitive data).

Classification of the incident.

Notification to employees – How, what should they do?

Determination if incident requires alternative business operations/instructions – What should they tell clients?

Containment and mitigation – who can help?

Notification to clients – Example, NPI breach notifications, Regulatory (e.g., SEC, FINRA), State and Law Enforcement.

Details of steps taken during the exercise:

Exercise Remedial actions (Lessons learned and preventative actions):

Update the incident response plan.



Office365 and G-Suite Security Features

Office365

Data Governance

- Data governance enables users to create, publish, and manually apply labels to documents; import data using drive shipping or over the network.
- Advanced data governance allows you to retain important information and delete unimportant information by classifying information based on a retention or deletion policy or both. It includes intelligent/automated actions such as recommending policies, automatically applying labels to data, applying labels based on sensitive data types or queries, disposition review, and use of smart import filters. It also includes the Supervision feature for reviewing employee communications for security and compliance purposes.

Data Loss prevention

- Office365 have policies that can be created to help locate where to protect content
 - **Conditions** the content must match before the rule is enforced. For example, a rule might be configured to look only for content containing Social Security numbers that's been shared with people outside your organization.
 - **Actions** that you want the rule to take automatically when content matching the conditions is found. For example, a rule might be configured to block access to a document and send both the user and compliance officer an email notification.

Message Encryption

- With Office 365 Message Encryption, your organization can send and receive encrypted email messages between people inside and outside your organization. Office 365 Message Encryption works with Outlook.com, Yahoo!, Gmail, and other email services. Email message encryption helps ensure that only intended recipients can view message content.
- Office 365 Message Encryption is an online service that's built on Microsoft Azure Rights Management (Azure RMS) which is part of Azure Information Protection. This includes encryption, identity, and authorization policies to help secure your email. You can

encrypt messages by using rights management templates, the Do Not Forward option, and the encrypt-only option.

- As an administrator, you can also define mail flow rules to apply this protection. For example, you can create a rule that requires the encryption of all messages addressed to a specific recipient, or that contains specific words in the subject line, and specify that recipients can't copy or print the contents of the message.

Data Security

- Control and help secure email, documents, and sensitive data inside and outside your company walls. From easy classification to embedded labels and permissions, always enhance data protection with Azure Information Protection, no matter where it's stored or who it's shared with.
- The protection technology uses *Azure Rights Management* (often abbreviated to Azure RMS). This technology is integrated with other Microsoft cloud services and applications, such as Office 365 and Azure Active Directory. It can also be used with your own line-of-business applications and information protection solutions from software vendors, whether these applications and solutions are on-premises, or in the cloud.

G-Suite

Data Governance

- More than five million businesses have made the move to G Suite to help employees work better together and be more productive, wherever and whenever they work. Google's solution is 100% cloud-based, which means software updates are as easy as refreshing your browser. With G Suite, there are no servers to purchase and maintain, reducing IT cost and complexity.
- Google Vault adds advanced data management and information governance capabilities to G Suite. It's a next-generation archive, retention, and eDiscovery solution for Apps that helps reduce risk associated with litigation, investigation, and internal and regulatory compliance. It lowers business and IT costs by enabling companies to more effectively manage the information stored in G Suite.

Data Loss Prevention

- Data loss prevention is as important in cloud computing as it is in on-premise software computing. The difference between the two can be seen in how data loss prevention in cloud applications, such as G Suite, is managed. Since cloud data is stored in servers owned and managed by the cloud application provider, IT managers are effectively outsourcing server infrastructure security. However, they will often find that the move to the cloud removes much of the visibility and control over data access and account behavior that they had before.

- Data loss prevention in Shared Drive is like Google Drive. The Google system admin defines a set of DLP rules, which can be created from templates or customized, that applies to all the files in Shared Drive. The G Suite data loss prevention system will then scan all the files and determine which ones contain the information it is looking for. It will prevent those files from being shared outside of the organization, and it will then revoke access to the files from users outside the organization.

Message Encryption

- When you're sending or receiving messages, you can see the level of encryption a message has. The color of the icon will change based on the level of encryption.
 - Green (S/MIME enhanced encryption) . Suitable for your most sensitive information. S/MIME encrypts all outgoing messages if we have the recipient's public key. Only the recipient with the corresponding private key can decrypt this message.
 - Gray (TLS - standard encryption) . Suitable for most messages. TLS (Transport Layer Security) is used for messages exchanged with other email services who don't support S/MIME.
 - Red (no encryption) . Unencrypted mail which is not secure. Past messages sent to the recipient's domain are used to predict whether the message you're sending won't be reliably encrypted.
- Opportunistic TLS (STARTTLS) is a protocol that helps provide privacy between communicating applications and their users during email delivery. When a server and client communicate, TLS ensures that no third party can overhear or tamper with any messages.
 - For delivery TLS to work, the email delivery services of both the sender and the receiver always must use TLS.
- S/MIME is a long-standing protocol which allows encrypted and signed messages to be sent using standard mail delivery SMTP.
- It uses public key cryptography to:
 - Encrypt the message on send and decrypt the message on receipt with a suitable private key to keep message content private.
 - Sign on send and verify the signature on receipt to authenticate and protect integrity.

Data Security

- Use 2-Step Verification (2SV) to protect accounts from unauthorized access. 2SV puts an extra barrier between your business and cybercriminals who try to steal usernames and passwords to access business data. Turning on 2SV is the single most important thing you can do to protect your business.



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

October 23 – 24 | Santa Monica, CA

Common Examination Findings

Thursday, October 24, 2019

10:15 a.m. – 11:15 a.m.

Join FINRA staff as they discuss FINRA's examination process and most common deficiencies identified during cycle examinations of small firms. Industry practitioners present effective practices for preparing for examinations, taking corrective action and updating compliance procedures, and practices based on lessons learned from common examination findings.

Moderator: Gerald Dougherty
Associate District Director, Sales Practice
FINRA Denver District Office

Speakers: Alif Dhanidina
Principal Regulatory Coordinator, Sales Practice
FINRA Los Angeles District Office

Shawn McLaughlin
President and Chief Executive Officer
McLaughlin Ryder Investments, Inc.

Harry Striplin
Chief Compliance Officer
Paulson Investment Company, LLC

Common Examination Findings Panelist Bios:

Moderator:

Gerald Dougherty is Associate District Director of FINRA's District 3 region with offices based in Denver, Colorado. Mr. Dougherty is responsible for overseeing the day-to-day execution of the district's regulatory programs. He served in the same capacity at NASD prior to its consolidation with NYSE Member Regulation in 2007. Prior to joining the west region, Mr. Dougherty began his career in 1987 as an examiner in the Philadelphia district office and was soon promoted to Exam Manager in the New York district office. He has presented at numerous compliance conferences, providing vital regulatory information to industry professionals. Mr. Dougherty has a BA in Economics from Ursinus College and a MS in Finance from Drexel University. To further his expertise in the securities industry, Mr. Dougherty graduated in 2007 from the FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional program™ (CRCP™).

Speakers:

Alif Dhanidina is Principal Regulatory Coordinator in the Los Angeles District Office of FINRA. Mr. Dhanidina's responsibilities include conducting risk assessments of member firms, planning firm examinations, and conducting firm examinations. Prior to joining FINRA, Mr. Dhanidina spent seven years as a Senior Counsel in the SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations in Washington DC. Previous to the SEC, Mr. Dhanidina was employed by the Illinois Securities Department as an Enforcement Attorney.

Shawn P. McLaughlin, AIF® has more than 35 years of investment experience and specializes in helping individuals, businesses and associations achieve their investment goals through careful and thorough financial planning. Mr. McLaughlin began his career with a major regional brokerage firm where he spent 20 years building his practice. He started his own firm 16 years ago and has owned his broker-dealer for nine years. Mr. McLaughlin holds an Accredited Investment Fiduciary™ (AIF®) designation. He earned his Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from Georgetown University and remains active as a mentor to students in Georgetown's business school. Mr. McLaughlin has been active in Northern Virginia business and civic communities for decades. He served on the Inova Health System Board of Trustees and is a past chairman of the Inova Foundation. Mr. McLaughlin served as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Virginia College Savings Plan (VCSP) from 2010 through 2017. Currently, Mr. McLaughlin serves on the Board of Visitors of the School of Business at Marymount University in Arlington, Virginia and the Board of Directors of Burke & Herbert Bank, as well as FINRA's Small Firm Advisory Committee. Additionally, Mr. McLaughlin serves as a member of the Board of Directors of Georgetown Visitation Preparatory School and is chairman of the Investment Committee. He is also chairman of the Finance Council of the Basilica of St. Mary Parish. Mr. McLaughlin holds Series 7, 9 and 10, 24, 63 and 65 licenses along with his Virginia Life, Health, and Variable Life annuity insurance licenses.

Harry Striplin is Chief Compliance Officer for Umpqua Investments, Inc., a small firm headquartered in Portland, Oregon. He has been with Umpqua Investments for nine years. Mr. Striplin has more than 36 years of experience working at small firms and more than 27 years serving as a Chief Compliance Officer in the small firm environment. He has served as a member of FINRA's District 3 Committee, the Securities Industry Regulatory Council on Continuing Education and has been a panelist at FINRA securities conferences. Mr. Striplin has been a member of the Securities Industry Continuing Education Content Committee for more than 20 years. Mr. Striplin serves as an arbitrator for FINRA Dispute Resolutions and has achieved his Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional™ (CRCP™) certification through the FINRA Institute at Wharton.



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Common Examination Findings



Panelists

■ Moderator

- **Gerald Dougherty, Associate District Director, Sales Practice, FINRA Denver District Office**

■ Panelists

- **Alif Dhanidina, Principal Regulatory Coordinator, Sales Practice, FINRA Los Angeles District Office**
- **Shawn McLaughlin, President and Chief Executive Officer, McLaughlin Ryder Investments, Inc.**
- **Harry Striplin, Chief Compliance Officer, Paulson Investment Company, LLC**

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INTRODUCTION

In both [2017](#) and [2018](#), FINRA issued Reports on Examination Findings in response to firms' requests that we make publicly available a summary of key findings from FINRA's examinations of member firms. Firms use this information, as well as effective practices observed by FINRA at certain firms, to anticipate potential areas of concern and improve their procedures and controls. (We subsequently refer to the two prior years' documents as the "2017 Report" and the "2018 Report.")

The name of this year's report—the "2019 Report on Examination Findings and Observations"—reflects FINRA's recent decision to distinguish more clearly between examination findings and observations. Findings constitute a determination that a firm or registered person has violated U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FINRA or other relevant rules. By contrast, observations (formerly known as recommendations) are suggestions to a firm about how it could improve its control environment in order to address perceived weaknesses that elevate risk, but do not typically rise to the level of a rule violation or cannot be tied to an existing rule, and are communicated to firms separately from the formal examination report. This report reflects key findings and observations identified in recent examinations, and contains effective practices, where noted, that could help firms improve their compliance and risk management programs. Where a matter is rule-based, the applicable regulatory sources ("Regulatory Obligations") are identified under the topic heading.

As a reminder, this report does not represent a complete inventory of findings, observations or effective practices. In fact, an individual firm may not have any deficiencies identified in this report, or may have other deficiencies that were not included. Similarly, we recognize that firms may employ effective practices that are not described in this report.

Further, this report does not create new legal or regulatory requirements or new interpretations of existing requirements. There should be no inference that FINRA requires firms to implement any specific effective practices described in this report or those that extend beyond the requirements of existing securities rules and regulations.

FINRA always welcomes feedback on how we can improve the content, structure, format or other elements of future reports on examination findings and observations. If you have suggestions, please contact Steven Polansky, Senior Director, Member Supervision, at (202) 728-8331 or by [email](#), or Elena Schlickemaier, Principal Research Analyst, Member Supervision, at (202) 728-6920 or by [email](#).

SALES PRACTICE AND SUPERVISION

Supervision

Regulatory Obligations

FINRA Rule [3110](#) (Supervision) requires firms to establish, maintain and enforce a system to supervise their activities and the activities of their associated persons that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with federal securities laws and regulations, as well as FINRA rules. This includes updating supervisory processes and written supervisory procedures (WSPs) to address new or amended rules, as well as products and services.

Customer account and trading supervision includes complying with other obligations, such as FINRA Rule [4512](#) (Customer Account Information), which specifies the categories of customer account information firms must maintain. Further, FINRA Rule [2231](#) (Customer Account Statements) generally requires firms to send customers account statements containing their securities positions, money balances and account activity at least once each calendar quarter. Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), as well as the FINRA Rule Series [4510](#) (Books and Records Requirements) prescribe recordkeeping obligations relating to customer account records, trading records and related documentation.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA noted the following issues relating to supervision and documentation requirements.

- ▶ **Insufficient WSPs for New or Amended Rules** – Some firms did not adequately address newly adopted or amended rules by developing controls to address the new requirements applicable to their business and updating their WSPs accordingly, for example: new fixed income mark-up disclosure requirements under FINRA Rule [2232](#) (Customer Confirmations); new trusted contact person information requirements pursuant to Rule [4512](#) (Customer Account Information); temporary holds, supervision and record retention requirements under new Rule [2165](#) (Financial Exploitation of Specified Adults) (if they intended to use the rule); and compliance with amended Rule [3310](#) (Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program), which incorporates FinCen's new Customer Due Diligence (CDD) rule obligations. Firms are expected to evaluate which new and amended laws and regulations apply to their business, and review whether their supervisory systems, WSPs and training programs need to be amended to comply with any new or amended requirement(s).
- ▶ **Limited Supervision and Internal Inspections** – Some firms did not have reasonably designed branch supervision and inspection programs. In particular, some firms did not adequately understand the activities being conducted through their branch offices, including products and services that were offered only at certain branch locations, which could prevent such firms from effectively supervising and addressing the unique risks of each branch location. Many firms also did not conduct periodic inspections of non-branch locations as required by FINRA Rule [3110\(c\)](#) (Internal Inspections); did not determine relevant areas of review at branch offices or non-branch locations, taking into consideration the nature and complexity of the products and services offered or any indicators of irregularities or misconduct; failed to reduce the inspections and reviews to a written report; or did not follow through on corrective action determined to be necessary through their branch inspections.
- ▶ **Inadequate Supervision of Account Statements, Consolidated Account Reports and Other Forms** – FINRA found that some firms did not consistently maintain accurate information in account documents, which impacted their ability to reasonably supervise account activity.
 - *Consolidated Account Reports (CARs)*¹ – In certain instances, firms did not have supervisory systems to evaluate whether and when registered representatives used CARs, did not know

when CARs included manual entries by representatives or customers, and did not require review of relevant customer documents to confirm that CARs accurately represented customers' assets and values that were held outside the broker-dealer. FINRA notes that firms with stronger supervisory systems maintained comprehensive WSPs and training addressing the use and supervision of CARs; had strict limits on the use of CARs, including around manual entries; and determined whether they accurately reflected customer holdings outside of the broker-dealer.

- *Falsifying Documents* – Some firms did not have reasonable processes to detect or prevent various forms of forgeries, including “accommodation forgery,” where registered representatives and associated persons asked customers to sign blank, partial or incomplete documents. Some firms expanded risk-based reviews of associated persons' communications to cover requests for customer signatures or enhanced firm reviews of customer complaints for issues relating to forgery or falsification of documents. In addition, some firms did not follow their protocols relating to notarization and medallion stamp guarantees, or did not have any supervisory procedures for supervising the use of such stamps.
- ▶ **Insufficient Supervision for Specific Types of Accounts** – FINRA noted the following supervisory issues.
 - *Restricted and Insider Accounts* – Some firms failed to update timely their watch and restricted lists, or reasonably identify and restrict account activity susceptible to insider trading. Other firms did not have surveillance systems or procedures to review and approve restricted trading because they relied on clearing firms to conduct the review. Both introducing and correspondent firms are required to have supervisory systems reasonably designed to detect and prevent insider trading.
 - *Margin Accounts* – Some firms allowed customers to open margin accounts even though the customers did not meet the firms' standards for such accounts. FINRA also identified that some firms' systems of supervision were not reasonably designed to detect recommended margin account activity that appeared to be unsuitable and inconsistent with the cost and expense of margin use. Many firms' supervisory systems could not identify situations where the firm failed to accurately disclose their own—as well as their clearing firms'—fees, costs and charges relating to customers' use of margin.
 - *Options Accounts* – FINRA noted instances where some firms did not identify or prevent registered representatives from creating and canceling fictitious orders to circumvent sales limits; mismarking opening options transactions as “closing”; listing inaccurate receipt time, execution time and origin codes on tickets; failing to record purchases and time of order transmission for routed options orders in the firms' order management systems; and failing to show the terms or conditions of the order on tickets.

Additional Resources

- ▶ [Regulatory Notice 10-19](#) (FINRA Reminds Firms of Responsibilities When Providing Customers with Consolidated Financial Account Reports)
- ▶ [New Account Application Template](#)
- ▶ [Supervision Topic Page](#)
- ▶ [Books and Records Topic Page](#)
- ▶ [Broker-Dealer – Written Supervisory Procedures Checklist](#)
- ▶ Supervision category of the [Peer-2-Peer Compliance Library](#)
- ▶ Customer Information category of the [Peer-2-Peer Compliance Library](#)

Suitability²

Regulatory Obligations

Currently, FINRA's suitability rule establishes obligations that are central to promoting ethical sales practices and high standards of professional conduct. FINRA Rule [2111](#) (Suitability) establishes three primary obligations for firms and their associated persons: (1) reasonable-basis suitability, (2) customer-specific suitability and (3) quantitative suitability.³

Noteworthy Examination Findings

Some firms did not have adequate systems of supervision to review that recommendations were suitable in light of a customer's individual financial situation and needs, investment experience, risk tolerance, time horizon, investment objectives, liquidity needs and other investment profile factors. This report shares some new suitability-related findings, as well as additional nuances on prior years' findings.

- ▶ **Inadequate Supervision of Product Exchanges** – Some firms did not maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to assess the suitability of recommendations that customers exchange certain products, such as mutual funds, variable annuities or unit investment trusts (UITs). In particular, some firms did not maintain blotters or other processes to identify patterns of unsuitable recommendations of exchanges involving long-term products.⁴ Additionally, some firms did not reasonably supervise exchanges because they could not verify the information provided by registered representatives in their rationales to justify a recommended exchange, such as inaccurate descriptions of product fees, costs and existing product values. In other instances, firm supervision did not detect that the source of funds for a purchase was misrepresented (*i.e.*, as “new” money), when other account information revealed another likely source of funds (*e.g.*, funds from a liquidation of another financial product at the firm).
- ▶ **Limited Supervision to Identify “Red Flags” for Suitability** – Some firms' supervisory systems were not reasonably designed or used to detect red flags of possible unsuitable transactions. For example, some firms did not identify or question patterns of similar recommendations by representatives or branch offices across many customers with different risk profiles, time horizons and investment objectives. In some instances, several customers of a representative or branch office appeared to have made “unsolicited” transactions in identical securities, which could raise questions around whether the transactions were actually “unsolicited.”
- ▶ **Inadequate Supervision of Changes to Customer Account Information** – As discussed further in the Supervision section of this report, FINRA noted instances where registered representatives unilaterally changed account information, such as customers' income, net worth or account objectives. In many instances, the changes preceded or were contemporaneous with one or more transactions that, but for the account change, would have been subject to heightened supervisory scrutiny, raised suitability concerns or would not have been approved.
- ▶ **Limited Supervision of Trading Activity for Excessive Trading or Churning** – FINRA identified a variety of situations where supervisors failed to recognize when a pattern of transactions rendered the series of recommendations unsuitable. FINRA also noted that some firms did not adequately train supervisors how to use exception reports to identify red flags indicative of excessive trading. In other cases, some firms did not appropriately respond to and address red flags indicating excessive trading identified through their exception reports.⁵

- ▶ **Unsuitable Options Strategy Recommendations** – FINRA identified registered representatives recommending complex options strategies to customers who did not have the sophistication to understand the features of an option or the associated strategy, or without adequately considering the customers’ individual financial situations and needs, as well as other investment profile factors. Further, some firms did not implement trade limits and controls to identify and prevent options trading that exceeded customer pre-approved investment levels.

Additional Resources

- ▶ [2017 Report – Product Suitability](#)
- ▶ [2018 Report – Suitability for Retail Customers](#)
- ▶ [Regulatory Notice 18-13](#) (FINRA Requests Comment on Proposed Amendments to the Quantitative Suitability Obligation Under FINRA Rule 2111)
- ▶ [Supervision Topic Page](#)
- ▶ [Suitability Topic Page](#)
- ▶ Customer Information category of the [Peer-2-Peer Compliance Library](#)

Digital Communication

Regulatory Obligations

Exchange Act Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4, as well as FINRA Rule [3110\(b\)\(4\)](#) (Review of Correspondence and Internal Communications) and FINRA Rule Series [4510](#) (Books and Records Requirements) require a firm to, among other things, create and preserve, in an easily accessible place, originals of all communications received and sent relating to its “business as such.” If a firm permits its associated persons to use a particular application—for example, an app-based messaging service or a collaboration platform—the firm must preserve records of business-related communications and supervise the activities and communications of those persons on the application. Firms remain responsible for conducting due diligence to comply with the securities laws and FINRA rules and follow up on red flags of potentially violative activity and may, in some cases, use services provided by the relevant digital channel or third-party vendors.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA has noted that some firms encountered challenges complying with supervision and recordkeeping requirements for various digital communications tools, technologies and services (collectively, “digital channels”).

- ▶ **Use of Prohibited Digital Channels** – In some instances, firms prohibited the use of texting, messaging, social media or collaboration applications (*e.g.*, WhatsApp, WeChat, Facebook, Slack or HipChat) for business-related communication with customers, but did not maintain a process to reasonably identify and respond to red flags that registered representatives were using impermissible personal digital channel communications in connection with firm business. Red flags could be detected through, for example, customer complaints, representatives’ email, outside business activity reviews or advertising reviews.
- ▶ **Prohibited Electronic Sales Seminars** – Some registered representatives conducted “electronic sales seminars” in a chatroom or on digital channels that were not permitted by their firms and were outside of supervision or recordkeeping programs.

Effective Practices

Firms implemented a number of effective practices to manage registered representatives’ use of digital channels.

- ▶ **Establishing Comprehensive Governance** – Some firms maintained governance processes to manage firm decisions and develop compliance processes for each new digital channel, as well as new features of existing channels. Such firms worked closely with their marketing, compliance and information technology departments, as well as their third-party vendors, to monitor the rapidly evolving array of communication methods available to their associated persons and customers.
- ▶ **Defining and Controlling Permissible Digital Channels** – Firms with holistic supervision and record retention programs and policies clearly defined permissible (as well as prohibited) digital channels; blocked prohibited digital channels (or prohibited features of permitted channels); restricted the use of messaging and collaboration apps that limit the firm’s ability to comply with its recordkeeping requirements (such as apps with end-to-end encryption or self-destructing messages); established how permitted communications will be stored in a compliant manner; and implemented supervisory review procedures for communication and recordkeeping that are appropriate for the firm’s business model and tailored to each digital channel.

- ▶ **Managing Video Content** – Some firms implemented WSPs to manage the lifecycle of video content, which could include, for example, live-streamed public appearances, scripted commercials or video blogs.
- ▶ **Training** – Some firms implemented mandatory training programs prior to providing registered representatives access to firm-approved digital channels. The training clarified the firms' expectations for business and personal digital communications, and assisted personnel with using all permitted features of each channel in a compliant manner.
- ▶ **Disciplining Misuse of Digital Communications** – Some firms temporarily suspended or permanently blocked from certain digital channels those registered representatives who did not comply with the firm's digital channel policies and required additional digital communications training.

Additional Resources

- ▶ *Regulatory Notice [19-31](#)* (Disclosure Innovations in Advertising and Other Communications with the Public)
- ▶ *Regulatory Notice [17-18](#)* (Guidance on Social Networking Websites and Business Communications)
- ▶ [Broker-Dealer Books and Records: New and Amended Recordkeeping Requirements Checklist](#)
- ▶ [Social Media Topic Page](#)
- ▶ [Books and Records Topic Page](#)

Anti-Money Laundering (AML)

Regulatory Obligations

The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires firms to monitor for, detect and report suspicious activity to the U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Further, FINRA Rule [3310](#) (Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program) requires that members develop and implement a written AML program reasonably designed to comply with the requirements of the BSA and regulations promulgated thereunder. FINRA also notes that FinCEN's CDD rule requires that firms identify beneficial owners of legal entity customers, understand the nature and purpose of customer accounts, conduct ongoing monitoring of customer accounts to identify and report suspicious transactions, and—on a risk basis—update customer information.⁶

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA identified the following issues relating to firms' AML programs, including challenges with transaction monitoring systems.

- ▶ **Inadequate AML Transaction Monitoring** – FINRA noted deficiencies in the design and implementation of systems and processes to detect and report suspicious activity:
 - Some firms did not tailor their transaction monitoring to address the risk(s) relating to the firms' business (for example, some firms did not adjust their AML programs for new sources of revenue or higher-risk customers with increased levels of activity, and other firms relied on FINRA's AML resources without tailoring them to the firms' business);⁷
 - Deficient transaction monitoring for suspicious trading and possible related money-laundering activity, which may have been due to an ongoing misconception that securities trading does not need to be monitored for suspicious activity reporting purposes, or inadequate delegation of duties to a group outside of the AML department (*e.g.*, the securities trading desk). As a result, some firms failed to detect red flags such as market dominance, prearranged trading or instances where groups of seemingly unrelated accounts were working in concert to manipulate stock prices; and
 - Transaction monitoring processes that were not reasonably designed to identify and investigate red flags associated with third-party wire transfers, where such red flags might include transfer requests that are out of the ordinary for the customer or appear designed to deter verification of the transfer instructions.
- ▶ **Overreliance on Clearing Firms** – FINRA found that some introducing firms continued to rely primarily or entirely on their clearing firm for transaction monitoring and suspicious activity reporting. While clearing firm inquiries about certain customers or activities can be triggers for further review by introducing firms, introducing firms are required to monitor for suspicious activity attempted or conducted through the firm.⁸

Additional Resources

- ▶ *Regulatory Notice [19-18](#)* (Guidance Regarding Suspicious Activity Monitoring and Reporting Obligations)
- ▶ [2017 Report – Anti-Money Laundering \(AML\) Compliance Program](#)
- ▶ [2018 Report – Anti-Money Laundering](#)
- ▶ [Anti-Money Laundering \(AML\) Template for Small Firms](#)
- ▶ [Frequently Asked Questions \(FAQ\) Regarding Anti-Money Laundering \(AML\)](#)
- ▶ [Anti-Money Laundering \(AML\) Topic Page](#)

Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA) and Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) Accounts

Regulatory Obligations

FINRA Rule [2090](#) (Know Your Customer) requires member firms and their associated persons to use reasonable diligence to determine the “essential facts” about every customer and “the authority of each person acting on behalf of such customer.” *Regulatory Notice 11-02* (SEC Approves Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Know-Your-Customer and Suitability Obligations) advised that firms verify the essential facts about a customer “at intervals reasonably calculated to prevent and detect any mishandling of a customer’s account that might result from the customer’s change in circumstances.”

Noteworthy Examination Findings

Generally, when UTMA or UGMA accounts (UTMA/UGMA Accounts) are established, the beneficiary (a minor) becomes the owner of the property at the time of the gift; however, the custodian manages and invests the property on the beneficiary’s behalf until the beneficiary reaches the age of majority, at which point the custodian is required to transfer the custodial property to the beneficiary.

FINRA noted that some firms did not establish, maintain or enforce a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with their continuing obligation to know the essential facts of their UTMA/UGMA Account customers. Specifically, the circumstances concerning the authority of a person acting on behalf of a customer will change in UTMA/UGMA Accounts when the account beneficiary reaches the age of majority.

FINRA found that many firms were aware of the need to transfer responsibility for the account at a future date because they had policies and procedures addressing this topic, such as noting the date of majority when setting up the account. However, even though they were aware of the need to transfer the account at a future date, some firms did not take any steps to track or monitor when beneficiaries would reach the age of majority, while other firms had procedures for their registered representatives to follow, but did not require any supervisory oversight. Further, in some instances, firms permitted custodians to effect transactions in, and withdraw, journal and transfer money from UTMA/UGMA Accounts months, or even years, after the beneficiaries reached the age of majority, and ignored red flags of such activity (e.g., customer complaints relating to such transactions).

Effective Practices

Some firms implemented a number of effective practices for verifying the authority of custodians of UTMA/UGMA Accounts.

- ▶ **Age of Majority** – Some firms maintained supervisory systems and used automated tools to track when each UTMA/UGMA Account beneficiary reached the age of majority.
- ▶ **Notification to Custodians** – Some firms issued letters or provided notifications to custodians to advise them that beneficiaries were approaching the age of majority and informed them about upcoming transfers of custodial property in their UTMA/UGMA Accounts, as well as any restrictions to the custodians’ trading authority after the beneficiaries reached the age of majority.
- ▶ **Notification to Registered Representatives** – Some firms maintained systems to provide registered representatives with automated alerts when beneficiaries reached the age of majority and required them to communicate with the custodian about the transfer of custodial property.

FIRM OPERATIONS

Observations on Cybersecurity

While many firms have made significant improvements in their cybersecurity programs, cybersecurity attacks continue to increase in both number and level of sophistication. FINRA notes that such attacks often take advantage of and highlight weaknesses in a firm's cybersecurity program. The observations and effective practices we share below can help firms strengthen their cybersecurity programs and may support compliance with the SEC's Regulation S-P, which requires firms to have policies and procedures addressing the protection of customer records and information.⁹

We encourage firms to strengthen their cybersecurity programs by taking advantage of FINRA publications and other resources identified below. FINRA recognizes that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to cybersecurity, and reminds firms to evaluate each of the controls described in this report and other FINRA resources in the context of their business model and risk profile.

Highlighted below are effective practices some firms have implemented to strengthen their cybersecurity risk-management programs.

- ▶ **Branch Controls** – Firms maintained branch-level written cybersecurity policies to protect confidential data. In addition, they implemented procedures to verify that branch office controls were implemented and functioning adequately, either via automated monitoring tools or during in-person branch inspections.
- ▶ **Documented Policies on Vendor and Third-Party Management** – Firms using third-party vendors that provide critical firm services or handle sensitive client information adopted, implemented, and documented formal policies and procedures to manage the lifecycle of the firm's engagement with the vendor (*i.e.*, from onboarding, to ongoing monitoring, through off-boarding, including defining how vendors will dispose of sensitive client information).
- ▶ **Incident Response Planning** – Firms established and regularly tested written formal incident response plans that outlined procedures they would follow when responding to cybersecurity and information security incidents. Firms also developed procedures relating to incident response plans, which included a mechanism to appropriately identify, classify, prioritize, track and close cybersecurity-related incidents.
- ▶ **Data Protection Controls** – Firms encrypted all confidential data, including sensitive customer information and firm information, whether stored internally or at vendors' locations.
- ▶ **System Patching** – Firms adopted procedures to implement timely application of system security patches to critical firm resources (*e.g.*, servers, network routers, desktops, laptops and software systems) to protect sensitive client or firm information.
- ▶ **Access Controls** – Firms implemented or maintained policies and procedures to grant system and data access only when required (often referred to as "Policy of Least Privilege") and removed such access when it was no longer needed (such as when individuals departed or changed roles at the firm). In addition, firms tracked (and monitored the activities of) individuals granted administrator access to data or systems. Further, firms implemented multi-factor or two-factor authentication controls for registered representatives, employees, vendors and contractors accessing firm systems and data from outside the organization.
- ▶ **Management of Asset Inventory** – Some firms created and kept current an inventory of critical information technology assets—including hardware, software and data—in home and branch offices. These inventories also included legacy assets that vendors no longer supported, as well as corresponding cybersecurity controls to protect those assets.

- ▶ **Data Loss Prevention Controls** – Certain firms implemented data loss prevention controls to protect a broad range of sensitive customer information in addition to Social Security numbers, such as other account profile information (*e.g.*, account numbers, dates of birth, bank information and driver's license numbers).
- ▶ **Training and Awareness** – Firms provided robust cybersecurity training for registered representatives, personnel, third-party providers and consultants. This training addressed key topics relevant to individuals' roles and responsibilities (*e.g.*, training on the various types of phishing emails that might be directed towards registered representatives' associates or home office staff in the human resources or finance departments, or training on secure software development practices for developers). Some firms determined the appropriate frequency of such training based on the cybersecurity risk exposure associated with the firm, as well as individuals' roles and responsibilities.
- ▶ **Change Management Processes** – Some firms implemented change management procedures to document, review, prioritize, test, approve, and manage hardware and software changes in order to protect sensitive information and firm services.

Additional Resources

- ▶ [Report on Cybersecurity Practices – 2015](#)
- ▶ [Report on Selected Cybersecurity Practices – 2018](#)
- ▶ [2017 Report – Cybersecurity](#)
- ▶ [Small Firm Cybersecurity Checklist](#)
- ▶ [Core Cybersecurity Controls for Small Firms](#)
- ▶ [Customer Information Protection Topic Page](#)
- ▶ [Cybersecurity Topic Page](#)
- ▶ Cybersecurity category of the [Peer-2-Peer Compliance Library](#)
- ▶ [Non-FINRA Cybersecurity Resources](#)

Business Continuity Plans (BCPs)

Regulatory Obligations

FINRA Rule [4370](#) (Business Continuity Plans and Emergency Contact Information) requires firms to create and maintain a written BCP with procedures that are reasonably designed to enable firms to meet their obligations to customers, counterparties and other broker-dealers during an emergency or significant business disruption.¹⁰ The rule also requires firms to review and update their BCPs, if necessary, in light of changes to firms' operations, structure, business or location. Further, although most introducing firms rely, to some extent, on their clearing firms to allow customers to access their accounts and enter transactions, they are responsible for compliance with the BCP rule.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA found some firms encountering challenges where their BCPs did not reflect certain market conditions, business models or other circumstances.

- ▶ **Incomplete Mission-Critical Systems** – Some firms' BCPs did not identify all of their mission-critical systems. Omitted systems included those used for order management for trading desks, or vendor systems that processed and managed financing transactions, such as securities lending and repurchase agreements.
- ▶ **Insufficient Capacity** – Some larger firms did not have sufficient capacity to handle substantially increased call volumes and online activity during a business disruption, which affected customers' ability to access their accounts.
- ▶ **No Updates for Operational Changes** – Some firms did not update their BCPs after significant operational changes, such as outsourcing critical operational functions, relocating data centers or replacing other key systems, including trading desk order management systems or other systems that are critical to firms' business lines.
- ▶ **Outdated Contact Information** – Some firms' BCPs contained outdated emergency contact information and did not identify how customers could access their funds and securities during a business disruption.
- ▶ **Local Document Storage** – Some firms allowed employees to maintain critical working documents on their computers' local drives rather than requiring that they be stored on the firms' network. Firms should review their controls to test whether these files would be secure and readily accessible.
- ▶ **No Registered Principal Registrations** – Some senior management personnel, who were responsible for performing the annual BCP review, did not maintain the required registered principal registration.¹¹

Effective Practices

Firms implement a number of effective practices to fulfill their obligations under the rule, especially those relating to testing of their BCP plans.

- ▶ **Engaging in Annual Testing** – Firms tested their BCPs as part of their annual review to confirm that the BCP was updated, and to evaluate its effectiveness, especially with respect to the functioning of mission-critical systems and processes, availability of key personnel and access to physical contingency site location(s). As part of these tests, some firms assessed their remote access capabilities to such systems, as well as evaluated and documented their ability to failover from one server to another. Firms also included key vendors in their BCP tests and documented results from those tests.

- ▶ **Incorporating Test Results into Firm Training** – Firms found these tests can be a valuable tool, not only to identify weaknesses in their BCPs, but also to train staff on how to implement the program, should that become necessary.

Additional Resources

- ▶ *Regulatory Notice [19-06](#)* (FINRA Requests Comment on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Its Rule on Business Continuity Plans and Emergency Contact Information)
- ▶ *Regulatory Notice [19-15](#)* (FINRA Publishes Consolidated Criteria to Designate Firms for Mandatory Participation in FINRA’s Business Continuity/Disaster Recovery Testing)
- ▶ [Business Continuity Plan FAQs](#)
- ▶ [Small Firm Business Continuity Plan Template](#)
- ▶ [Business Continuity Planning Topic Page](#)

Fixed Income Mark-up Disclosure

Regulatory Obligations

FINRA's and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's (MSRB) amendments to FINRA Rule [2232](#) (Customer Confirmations) and MSRB Rule [G-15](#) require firms to provide additional transaction-related pricing information to retail customers for certain trades in corporate, agency and municipal debt securities (other than municipal fund securities).¹²

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA identified many of the issues previously discussed in the [Fixed Income Mark-up Disclosure](#) section of the [2018](#) Report, as well as the following additional issues.

- ▶ **Excluding Charges from Mark-Up/Mark-Down Disclosure** – Some firms disclosed additional charges separately from disclosed mark-ups or mark-downs, even when such charges reflected firm compensation. Firm compensation should not be mischaracterized, for example, as miscellaneous or fixed transaction fees; it should instead be included in the reported price of the transaction and accounted for when calculating mark-ups and mark-downs, consistent with applicable rules and guidance.¹³
- ▶ **Unclear or Inaccurate Labels for Sales Credits or Concessions** – Some firms disclosed registered representatives' sales credits or concessions as separate line items on confirmations, in addition to the mark-up or mark-down, without clear and accurate labeling, creating confusion about the actual disclosed mark-up and therefore diminishing its utility.¹⁴ Similarly, some firms inaccurately labeled only the sales credits or concessions portion as the total mark-up or mark-down.
- ▶ **Incorrect Prevailing Market Price (PMP) Determinations** – Some firms did not determine the PMP as set forth in FINRA Rule [2121.02\(b\)](#) (Additional Mark-Up Policy for Transactions in Debt Securities, Except Municipal Securities) for their fixed income transactions. Some firms' PMP determinations did not presumptively rely on the dealer's contemporaneous cost or proceeds, as required by Rule [2121](#). Other firms decided that their cost or proceeds were no longer "contemporaneous" without sufficient evidence as required by Rule [2121.02\(b\)\(4\)](#) and used other pricing information to determine the PMP.
- ▶ **Inaccurate Time of Execution** – Some firms disclosed times of execution on customer confirmations that did not match the times of execution disseminated by the Electronic Municipal Market Access system (EMMA) or Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).¹⁵ The time of execution on confirmations must match the trade times disseminated by EMMA and TRACE to allow customers to identify their specific transactions, consistent with the intent of the disclosure requirement.

Additional Resources

- ▶ [Regulatory Notice 17-24](#) (FINRA Issues Guidance on the Enhanced Confirmation Disclosure Requirements in Rule 2232 for Corporate and Agency Securities)
- ▶ [Report Center](#) – FINRA's MSRB Markup/Markdown Analysis Report
- ▶ [Report Center](#) – FINRA's TRACE Markup/Markdown Analysis Report
- ▶ [Fixed Income Confirmation Disclosure: Frequently Asked Questions \(FAQ\)](#)
- ▶ [Municipal Securities Topic Page](#)
- ▶ [Fixed Income Topic Page](#)

MARKET INTEGRITY

Best Execution

Regulatory Obligations

FINRA Rule [5310](#) (Best Execution and Interpositioning) requires firms to conduct a “regular and rigorous” review of the execution quality of customer orders if the firm does not conduct an order-by-order review.¹⁶ Where “regular and rigorous” reviews are used instead of order-by-order reviews, the reviews must be performed at a minimum on a quarterly basis and on a security-by-security, type-of-order basis (e.g., limit order, market order and market on open order). If a firm identifies any material differences in execution quality among the markets that trade the securities under review, it must modify its routing arrangements or justify why it is not doing so.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA continued to identify issues with some firms’ execution quality reviews, as well as conflicts of interest and related disclosures.

- ▶ **No Execution Quality Assessment of Competing Markets** – Some firms did not compare the quality of the execution of their existing order routing and execution arrangements against the quality of executions that the firm could have obtained from competing venues.
- ▶ **No Review of Certain Order Types** – In some instances, firms did not conduct adequate reviews on a type-of-order basis, including, for example, on market, marketable limit or non-marketable limit orders.
- ▶ **No Evaluation of Required Factors** – Some firms did not consider factors set forth in FINRA Rule [5310](#) (Best Execution and Interpositioning) when conducting their execution quality reviews, including, among other things, the speed of execution, price improvement opportunities and the likelihood of execution of limit orders.
- ▶ **Conflicts of Interest** – Some firms did not adequately consider and address potential conflicts of interest relating to their routing of orders to affiliated alternative trading systems (ATSS) or market centers that provide payment for order flow or other routing inducements. In addition, some firms continue to route significant portions of their order flow to such venues without conducting an adequate “regular and rigorous” review to support such routing decisions.
- ▶ **Inadequate SEC Rule 606 Disclosures** – Some firms did not provide adequate information in the material disclosures section of their order routing reports required by Rule 606 of Regulation NMS. For example, certain firms did not disclose, when required, the specific, material aspects of the non-directed order flow routed to their own trading desk, including that the firm stands to share in 100 percent of the profits generated by the firm’s trading as principal with its customers’ orders.¹⁷ Other firms did not disclose material aspects of their relationships with each of the significant venues identified on their reports, including descriptions and terms of all arrangements for payment for order flow (including the amounts of payment for order flow on a per share or per order basis)¹⁸ and profit-sharing relationships that may have influenced the firms’ order routing decisions.

Additional Resources

- ▶ [2017 Report – Best Execution](#)
- ▶ [2018 Report – Best Execution](#)
- ▶ [Regulatory Notice 15-46](#) (Guidance on Best Execution Obligations in Equity, Options and Fixed Income Markets)
- ▶ [Report Center, Equity Report Cards](#) section – FINRA’s Best Execution Outside-of-the-Inside Report Card

Direct Market Access Controls

Regulatory Obligations

Compliance with Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5 (Market Access Rule) requires firms that provide access to trading in securities on an exchange or ATS to incorporate appropriate controls to mitigate key risks. The Market Access Rule is particularly important with the continued increase in automated and high-speed trading.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA continued to find many of the same issues identified in the Market Access Controls sections of the [2017](#) and [2018](#) Reports, as well as additional challenges with certain other market access controls, especially those related to fixed income transactions.

- ▶ **Insufficient Controls and WSPs** – Some firms' risk management controls and WSPs did not include pre-trade order limits, pre-set capital thresholds and duplicative and erroneous order controls for accessing ATSs, especially for fixed income transactions.
- ▶ **Inadequate Financial Risk Management Controls** – In some instances, firms with market access, or those that provide it, did not establish appropriate capital thresholds for trading desks, aggregate daily limits, or credit limits on institutional customers and counterparties. In some instances, firms with market access, or those that provide it, did not have reasonably designed risk-management controls or WSPs to manage the financial, regulatory or other risks associated with this business activity. Firms should regularly assess the appropriateness of their capital thresholds and pre-set credit limits for each customer.
- ▶ **Inadequate Basis for CEO Certification** – Some firms did not maintain reasonably designed risk-management controls that could support the CEO's certification pursuant to the requirements of Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5(e)(2).
- ▶ **Inaccurate Intra-day (Ad Hoc) Adjustments** – FINRA identified weaknesses in some firms' processes for requesting, approving, reviewing and documenting ad hoc credit threshold increases. For example, institutional clients requested ad hoc (daily) adjustments to financial limits in anticipation of increased order activity related to events such as an index rebalancing or a public offering, but once the event concluded (typically the next trading day), firms did not return the limits to their original values. Some firms maintained a manual process for reverting limits to their original values or did not revert the elevated credit limits in a timely fashion, which exposed clients and firms to elevated levels of financial risk.
- ▶ **Ineffective Erroneous Trading Controls** – Some firms failed to implement adequate controls relating to duplicative and erroneous orders. For example, some firms set controls to prevent the routing of a market order based on impact (Average Daily Volume Control) at unreasonable levels, preventing such firms from blocking erroneous trades. These controls can be effective tools (particularly in thinly traded securities) when set at reasonably high levels, and firms should calibrate them to reflect, among other things, the characteristics of the relevant securities, the business of the firm, and market conditions.
- ▶ **Insufficient Post-Trade Controls and Surveillance** – Some firms that provide direct market access via multiple systems, including sponsored access arrangements, did not employ reasonable controls to confirm that those systems' records were aggregated and integrated in a timely manner. As a result, those firms were not able to successfully conduct holistic post-trade and supervisory reviews for, among other things, potential manipulative trading patterns.

Additional Resources

- ▶ *Regulatory Notice [15-09](#)* (Guidance on Effective Supervision and Control Practices for Firms Engaging in Algorithmic Trading Strategies)
- ▶ *Regulatory Notice [16-21](#)* (SEC Approves Rule to Require Registration of Associated Persons Involved in the Design, Development or Significant Modification of Algorithmic Trading Strategies)
- ▶ [Algorithmic Trading Topic Page](#)
- ▶ [Market Access Topic Page](#)

Short Sales

Regulatory Obligations

Regulation SHO Rules 200 to 204 require firms to address risks relating to market manipulation, market liquidity and investor confidence by regulating excessive and “naked” short sales so that purchasers of securities from short sellers receive their securities positions in a timely manner. Regulation SHO requires firms to appropriately mark their securities orders; confirm that they have deliverable securities to complete short sale transactions; and have a process to close-out fails to deliver within the required timeframes.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

In addition to the findings FINRA shared in the [Regulation SHO](#) section of the [2017](#) Report, we found some firms were not able to satisfy the Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) System fail-to-deliver close-out requirements pursuant to Rule 204 because they did not implement a sufficient process to age fails, resulting in fails not being closed out timely. In other instances, firms did not accurately allocate CNS fails to correspondents. For example, some firms faced challenges relating to both inaccurate calculation of pre-fail credits prior to allocating fails to the correspondent, and used inconsistent methods when allocating fails to the correspondents where the share quantities exceeded the CNS fails.

In addition, firms may consider as an effective practice to periodically review their policies relating to rates charged for borrowing, sourcing or locating securities in connection with short sales, including monitoring the aging of short positions and determining whether the rates assigned at the onset of those positions are still appropriate.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Observations on Liquidity and Credit Risk Management

Effective liquidity and credit risk management controls are critical elements in a broker-dealer's risk management framework, and should be documented in a firm's books and records.¹⁹ FINRA routinely reviews firms' practices in these areas, and in *Regulatory Notice 15-33* (Guidance on Liquidity Risk Management Practices) shared observations on liquidity management practices.

FINRA shares the following practices that some firms used to strengthen their liquidity management programs.

- ▶ **Liquidity Contingency Plans** – Small clearing and introducing firms developed contingency plans for operating in a stressed environment and outlined specific steps to address certain stress conditions. Further, firms' contingency plans identified the firm staff responsible for enacting the plan, the process for accessing liquidity during a stress event or standards to determine how liquidity funding would be used.
- ▶ **Liquidity Risk Management Updates** – Firms updated their liquidity risk management practices to take into account their current business activities.
- ▶ **Stress Tests** – Firms conducted stress tests in a manner and frequency that was appropriate for their business model. In addition, such stress tests evaluated the potential impact of off-balance sheet items on liquidity. Some firms that relied on a shared funding source with affiliated entities for their liquidity stress test and their shared Master Credit Agreement confirmed that source would be ring-fenced for them during a stress event.
- ▶ **Credit Risk Management** – Firms maintained a robust internal control framework to capture, measure, aggregate, manage and report credit risk.²⁰ In particular, firms evaluated their risk management and control processes to review whether they were accurately capturing their exposure to credit risk; maintained approval and documentation processes for increases or other changes to assigned credit limits; and monitored exposure to their affiliated counterparties.

Additional Resources

- ▶ [2018 Report – Liquidity](#)
- ▶ [Regulatory Notice 10-57](#) (Funding and Liquidity Risk Management Practices)
- ▶ [Funding and Liquidity Topic Page](#)

Segregation of Client Assets

Regulatory Obligations

Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3 (Customer Protection Rule) requires firms that maintain custody of customer securities and safeguard customer cash to segregate these assets from the firm's proprietary business.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA has continued to identify many of the same concerns noted in the [Segregation of Client Assets](#) section of the [2018](#) Report, including challenges with check-forwarding and possession or control.

- ▶ **Omitted or Inaccurate Blotter Information** – Some firms' blotters lacked sufficient information to demonstrate that checks were forwarded in a timely manner or contained inaccurate information with respect to the status of checks.
- ▶ **Inadequate Possession or Control Processes** – FINRA noted the following deficiencies:
 - Failure to obtain documentation (no lien letters) from custodians and issuers to show that all securities in a good control location were free of liens that could be exercised by a third party on the firm;
 - Inability to identify deficits in fully paid and excess margin securities when certain firms did not correctly age the deficits due to errors in their formulas;
 - Failure to confirm that fully paid securities were correctly segregated at custodian banks (FINRA notes that firms should consider verifying whether they have sufficient securities positions that exceed possession or control requirements prior to transferring such excess securities from a custodial account); and
 - Failure to combine balances and positions in related customer securities accounts and accounts with the same Taxpayer Identification Numbers in order to determine the extent to which the market value of securities carried for the customer's account exceeded 140 percent of the customer's debit balance.
- ▶ **Inaccurate Reserve Formula Calculations** – Some firms did not exclude concentrated margin debit balances²¹ because they did not have a process to identify accounts under common control or related customer accounts.
- ▶ **Coding Errors** – FINRA noted joint customer and firm officer accounts miscoded as "non-customer" rather than "customer." Some firms also coded foreign bank accounts as "PAB" without obtaining a written agreement acknowledging that the accounts are proprietary transactions of the foreign bank.²²

Additional Resources

- ▶ [Interpretations of Financial and Operational Rules](#)
- ▶ [Customer Protection – Reserves and Custody of Securities \(SEA Rule 15c3-3\)](#)

Net Capital Calculations

Regulatory Obligations

Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1 (Net Capital Rule) requires firms to maintain net capital at specific levels to protect customers and creditors from monetary losses that can occur when firms fail.

Noteworthy Examination Findings

FINRA has continued to identify some of the same concerns noted in the [Net Capital and Credit Risk Assessments](#) section of the 2017 Report and [Accuracy of Net Capital Calculations](#) section of the 2018 Report, as well as the following additional issues.

- ▶ **Incorrect Inventory Haircuts** – Some firms did not apply correct haircut charges when computing net capital because they did not adequately assess and monitor the creditworthiness of fixed income securities, such as corporate debt and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), to determine whether these products have a “minimal amount of creditworthiness” pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(I).²³
- ▶ **Incorrect Capital Charges for Underwriting Commitments** – Some firms did not maintain an adequate process to assess moment-to-moment and open contractual commitment capital charges on underwriting commitments and did not understand their role as it pertained to the underwriting (*i.e.*, best efforts or firm commitment).²⁴
- ▶ **Inaccurate Classification of Receivables, Liabilities and Revenue** – In some instances, firms inaccurately classified receivables, liabilities and revenues, which resulted in inaccurate reporting of a firm’s financial position and, in some instances, a capital deficiency. In addition, upon settlement of a customer claim, some firms understated their liability by recognizing the monies due to the customer based on a payment schedule instead of recognizing the full amount owed at the time of settlement.
- ▶ **Recognition of Insurance Claims** – Some firms did not recognize on their books and records receivables due from insurance carriers and the corresponding liabilities owed to customers. Other firms did not obtain an opinion of counsel with respect to claims within seven business days, as required under Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(D), thereby resulting in the receivables not being allowable for purposes of net capital, and the firm being required to take the full charge for the customer claim.
- ▶ **Inadequate Documentation of Methodology for Expense-Sharing Agreements** – Some firms did not maintain sufficient documentation to substantiate their methodology for allocating specific broker-dealer costs to the firm or an affiliate. Some firms were not accurately accruing expenses—such as technology fees, marketing charges, retirement account administrative fees and employees’ compensation—on their books and records. Further, some firms incorrectly netted intercompany accounts with different affiliated entities,²⁵ resulting in books and records that did not accurately reflect the firms’ operating performance and financial condition.

Additional Resources

- ▶ [Interpretations of Financial and Operational Rules](#)
- ▶ [Notice to Members 03-63](#) (SEC Issues Guidance on the Recording of Expenses and Liabilities by Broker/Dealers)

ENDNOTES

1. See *Regulatory Notice 10-19* (FINRA Reminds Firms of Responsibilities When Providing Customers with Consolidated Financial Account Reports).
2. On June 5, 2019, the SEC voted to adopt a package of rulemakings and guidance, including Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI). This section is intended to provide firms with findings solely related to compliance with existing FINRA suitability and related supervisory obligations and does not address Reg BI. For additional information, please see FINRA's [Topic Page on SEC Regulation Best Interest \(Reg BI\)](#).
3. In addition to the items discussed in this document, FINRA reminds firms to consider the findings FINRA shared previously regarding [overconcentration in illiquid securities](#), [reasonable due diligence for private placements](#) and certain [variable annuity exchanges](#).
4. See FINRA Rule [2330\(d\)](#) (Members' Responsibilities Regarding Deferred Variable Annuities).
5. FINRA continued to note many of the challenges we discussed in the [Abuse of Authority](#) section of the [2018 Report](#), including registered representatives engaging in discretionary trading without written authorization.
6. See *Regulatory Notices 17-40* (FINRA Provides Guidance to Firms Regarding Anti-Money Laundering Program Requirements Under FINRA Rule 3310 Following Adopting of FinCEN's Final Rule to Enhance Customer Due Diligence Requirements For Financial Institutions) and [18-19](#) (FINRA Amends Rule 3310 to Conform to FinCEN's Final Rule on Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions) for additional information.
7. See *Regulatory Notice 19-18* (FINRA Provides Guidance to Firms Regarding Suspicious Activity Monitoring and Reporting Obligations) for a list of potential red flags that firms should consider when designing an effective AML compliance program that is tailored to their business.
8. See [Frequently Asked Questions \(FAQ\) Regarding Anti-Money Laundering \(AML\)](#), Question No. 22.
9. This obligation includes protection against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of customer records and information, as well as unauthorized access to or use of such records or information. Also, the rule requires firms to provide initial and annual privacy notices to customers describing information sharing policies and informing customers of their rights.
10. Pursuant to *Regulatory Notice 19-06* (FINRA Requests Comment on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Its Rule on Business Continuity Plans and Emergency Contact Information), FINRA is conducting a retrospective review of Rule [4370](#). This section is intended to provide firms with findings solely relating to compliance with existing Rule [4370](#) and does not address the outcome of that review or any potential revisions to the rule.
11. See FINRA Rule [4370\(d\)](#).
12. Specifically, the amendments require firms to disclose the mark-up or mark-down for principal trades with retail customers that a firm offsets on the same day with other principal trades in the same security. Disclosed mark-ups and mark-downs must be expressed as both a total dollar amount for the transaction and a percentage of PMP. In addition, for all retail customer trades in corporate, agency and municipal debt securities (other than municipal fund securities), firms must disclose on the confirmation the time of execution and a security-specific link to the FINRA or MSRB website where additional information about the transaction is available, along with a brief description of the information available on the website.
13. See, e.g., [Frequently Asked Questions \(FAQ\) About the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine \(TRACE\) FAQ 3.1.33](#) (stating that prices reported to TRACE should be inclusive of mark-ups and mark-downs).
14. See FINRA [Fixed Income Confirmation Disclosure: Frequently Asked Questions \(FAQ\)](#), FAQ 2.3 and MSRB [Confirmation Disclosure and Prevailing Market Price Guidance: Frequently Asked Questions](#), FAQ 2.3.
15. See FINRA [Fixed Income Confirmation Disclosure: Frequently Asked Questions \(FAQ\)](#), FAQ 4.2; MSRB [Confirmation Disclosure and Prevailing Market Price: Frequently Asked Questions](#), FAQ 4.2.
16. See also *Regulatory Notice 15-46* (Guidance on Best Execution Obligations in Equity, Options and Fixed Income Markets).
17. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Market Regulation: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 13A Frequently Asked Question about Rule 11Ac1-6, Question 14: Disclosing Internalized Order Flow.
18. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Market Regulation: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 13A Frequently Asked Question about Rule 11Ac1-6, Question 13: Disclosing Payment for Order Flow.
19. See Exchange Act Rule 17a-3(a)(23).
20. See Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 70072 (July 30, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 51824 (Aug. 21, 2013), at 51848; see also FINRA's [Resource Page for the SEC's July 2013 Financial Responsibility Rule Amendments](#).
21. See the SEC's Note E(5) to Exhibit A of SEA Rule 15c3-3 and the associated interpretation, [Determination of the Includible Amount of a Customer's Concentrated Margin Debit Balance in the Reserve Formula](#), Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3, Exhibit A - Note E(5)/01, in the Interpretations of Financial and Operational Rules.
22. Regarding foreign banks, see [Foreign Banks - Customer and Non-Customer Classification](#), Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3(a)(1)/032, in the Interpretations of Financial and Operational Rules.
23. These requirements were adopted as part of the SEC's 2013 credit ratings amendments. See Exchange Act Release No. 71194 (Dec. 27, 2013), 79 Fed. Reg. 1522 (Jan. 8, 2014).
24. See Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(viii); see also [Moment Net Capital](#), Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1(a)(1)/001, in the Interpretations of Financial and Operational Rules.
25. See [Netting of Intercompany Receivables and Payables with Affiliates](#), Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(C)/073 in the Interpretations of Financial and Operational Rules.



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

October 23 – 24 | Santa Monica, CA

AML Challenges and Effective Practices

Thursday, October 24, 2019

11:30 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

During this session, FINRA staff and industry practitioners discuss common challenges small firms face in establishing and implementing AML compliance programs, as well as practical solutions to these challenges that FINRA staff and industry professionals have developed and observed.

Moderator: Jeff Aelmore
Surveillance Director, Sales Practice
FINRA Denver District Office

Speakers: Kent Lund
Interim Chief Executive Officer, Co-Head of Investment Banking and Co-Chief
Compliance Officer
GVC Capital LLC

Lea Satterfield
Principal Examiner
FINRA Anti-Money Laundering Investigative Unit (AMLIU)

Craig Watanabe
Financial Adviser and Director of IA Compliance
DFPG Investments, Inc.

AML Challenges and Effective Practices Panelist Bios:

Moderator:

Jeff Aelmore is the surveillance director of the Denver District office of FINRA with more than 10 years of experience in examination roles. He currently manages a team of Regulatory Coordinators and is responsible for risk assessment, financial, operational and sales practice surveillance for approximately 200 broker-dealers. Mr. Aelmore was previously an examiner for FINRA in the Dallas District office from 2005 through 2010 and was an Examination Manager in the Seattle District office from 2010 through 2015. Mr. Aelmore is a Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional™ (CRCP™) from the FINRA Institute at the Wharton School of Business and is a graduate from Kansas State University with a bachelor's degree in finance and a minor in economics.

Speakers:

Kent J. Lund is interim CEO, Co-Head of Investment Banking and Co-CCO of GVC Capital LLC, a boutique investment banking and securities B/D headquartered in Greenwood Village, CO. Since 1998, Mr. Lund has worked principally in the securities and financial services business, serving in a variety of business, compliance and legal roles. For example, he has served as a Director, executive officer, CCO and/or General Counsel of: a NYSE member securities clearing firm; a full service B/D, and its affiliated RIAs and trust company; a municipal securities-focused B/D, and its affiliated investment banking firm and RIA; and a retail-focused independent contractor-model B/D. Mr. Lund holds currently or has held previously nine securities licenses: Series 7, 9, 10, 14, 24, 53, 63, 66 and 79. Prior to entering the securities business, Mr. Lund clerked for two federal court of appeals judges, worked as an associate attorney in a large private law firm, and worked as an in-house corporate attorney for a large multinational corporation. He holds J.D., M.B.A. and LL.M. (in Entrepreneurial Law) degrees. Mr. Lund currently serves as a member (and Vice Chair) of the Colorado Securities Board, and as an independent director (and member of the Audit Committee) of a large private, P/E-controlled wireless internet services provider.

Lea Satterfield is Principal Examiner within FINRA's AML Investigative Unit, a specialized team that conducts complex Anti-Money Laundering examinations, provides guidance to FINRA's examination and Enforcement staff in connection with AML-related matters, and provides education and training to FINRA staff and industry personnel throughout the country. Ms. Satterfield serves as an AML Regulatory Specialist within FINRA. Ms. Satterfield passed the Certified Financial Planner examination and is a Certified Fraud Examiner. Ms. Satterfield graduated from the University of Missouri with a Bachelor's degree in Personal Financial Planning, and from Arizona State University she earned a Masters of Business Administration with an emphasis in Finance. Ms. Satterfield works from FINRA's Kansas City District Office, and has been with FINRA for eight years.

Craig R. Watanabe, CSCP®, AIF®, CFP® has been a Financial Adviser and the Director of IA Compliance at DFPG Investments, LLC. ("DFPG") since April 2018. Mr. Watanabe entered the securities industry in 1983 and has been a successful financial planner, Branch Manager, Operations Manager, Chief Compliance Officer and Chief Operating Officer. Mr. Watanabe has broker-dealer and investment adviser compliance experience covering retail brokerage, market making, research, investment banking, insurance, commodities, retail investment advisory and ERISA plans. In his current role as a financial adviser with DFPG, Mr. Watanabe works with clients to assist in growing and protecting their assets and planning to meet their financial objectives. DFPG is a registered broker-dealer and investments adviser. Mr. Watanabe is responsible for the investment adviser compliance program. Mr. Watanabe served on the FINRA District 2 Committee from 2008-2011 and was Chairman of the Committee in 2011. He also served six years on the NSCP Board of Directors and was Chairman of the Board in 2013. Mr. Watanabe is a frequent speaker at conferences and has authored numerous articles and training modules for financial professionals. Securities and advisory services are offered through DFPG Investments, LLC, Member of FINRA and SIPC.



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Panelists

■ Moderator

- **Jeff Aelmore, Surveillance Director, Sales Practice, FINRA Denver District Office**

■ Panelists

- **Kent Lund, Interim Chief Executive Officer, Co-Head of Investment Banking and Co-Chief Compliance Officer, GVC Capital LLC**
- **Lea Satterfield, Principal Examiner, FINRA Anti-Money Laundering Investigative Unit (AMLIU)**
- **Craig Watanabe, Financial Adviser and Director of IA Compliance, DFPG Investments, Inc.**

What is FINRA seeing?

- **What is FINRA's AML Investigative Unit?**
- **Examinations and enforcement has revealed issues in:**
 - Policy and procedure design
 - Implementation: Performing reviews
 - Execution – Evidencing reviews
 - Monitoring – Failures of non-integrated systems and a lack of information sharing within the firm
- **Trends, concerns, and effective practices**

The Scope of AML is Extremely **B R O A D**

- In addition to money laundering, AML issues include
 - Fraud
 - Securities law violations
 - Cyber incidents
 - Senior incidents
- AML should be viewed through a wide-angle lens
 - Narrowly focused reviews through a telephoto lens could miss issues on the periphery
 - When reviewing money movements, reviewers must be open-minded

KYC and CDD

■ Primer on the new (May 2018) CDD rules

- For entities, firms must drill down to the beneficial owners to satisfy the CDD requirement
- Many criminals are smart enough to not use their own names on an account, so often illicit activity is conducted in entity accounts

■ FINRA Regulatory Notice 18-19 – Customer Due Diligence

■ FINRA Regulatory Notice 17-40

■ Conduct a “negative news” search and keep a wide-angle lens

■ What’s the story?

Monitoring for Suspicious Activity

- **Money Laundering Red Flags – Reg Notice 19-18**
- **Should monitoring for suspicious activity be a discreet function or across the firm?**
- **Does the firm's staff have the requisite knowledge and experience to recognize suspicious activity?**

AML Considerations for Direct Business

- Yes indeed, the AML rules apply to direct business
- Satisfying regulatory AML obligations for direct business can be challenging due to limitations of available data
- Many firms have automated compliance systems that provide AML exception reports, however, most of these do not integrate direct business

The Value of Collaboration

■ Build a relationship with your clearing firm's AML Officer

- The AML Officers typically have a lot of experience
- Clearing firms have AML resources that small firms do not have
- You can learn a lot from AML Officers

■ When performing investigations, understand the benefits of information sharing under 314(b)

■ Don't hesitate to seek help and advice from others

Internet Searches

- Internet searches are a valuable tool for KYC and CDD
- Performing internet searches is a skill and some people will be better than others
- Internet searches are particularly helpful for CDD on entities
- How often should internet searches be performed?
 - How often should other AML reviews be performed?

Effective AML Training

- Online training versus live training
- Understand how to recognize, placement, layering and integration
- Learn from the misfortunes of others by reviewing litigation releases
- Study the methods of criminals
- Actual AML cases and sanctions (on firms and individuals) hit home

Compliance Resources

■ FINRA Regulatory Notice 19-18

- www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/19-18
 - Potential Red Flags in Customer Due Diligence and Interactions with Customers, Deposits of Securities, Securities Trading, Money Movements, Insurance Products, and Other Potential Red Flags.

■ FINRA Regulatory Notice 18-19

- www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/18-19
 - Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions

■ FINRA Regulatory Notice 17-40

- www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/17-40
 - Guidance on Enhanced Customer Due Diligence Requirements

Compliance Resources

■ FINRA Compliance Tools:

- www.finra.org/compliance-tools/all-compliance-tools

■ AML Template for Small Firms —

- www.finra.org/compliance-tools/anti-money-laundering-template-small-firms
- MUST be carefully tailored to the firm's specific business

■ Dedicated AML Page (Overview, Rules, Notices, Guidance, News Releases, Investor Education):

- www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/aml



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

October 23 – 24 | Santa Monica, CA

AML Challenges and Effective Practices

Thursday, October 24, 2019

11:30 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

Resources

FINRA Regulatory Notices

- FINRA Regulatory Notice 19-18, *Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Program, FINRA Provides Guidance to Firms Regarding Suspicious Activity Monitoring and Reporting Obligations* (May 2019)
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/Regulatory-Notice-19-18.pdf
- FINRA Regulatory Notice 18-19, *Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Program, FINRA Amends Rule 3310 to Conform to FinCEN's Final Rule on Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions* (May 2018)
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-18-19.pdf
- FINRA Regulatory Notice 17-40, *FinCEN's Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions and FINRA Rule 3310, FINRA Provides Guidance to Firms Regarding Anti-Money Laundering Program Requirements Under FINRA Rule 3310 Following Adoption of FinCEN's Final Rule to Enhance Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions* (November 2017)
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-17-40.pdf

Other FINRA Resources

- FINRA Compliance Tools
www.finra.org/compliance-tools/all-compliance-tools
- AML Template for Small Firms
www.finra.org/compliance-tools/anti-money-laundering-template-small-firms
- Dedicated AML Page (Overview, Rules, Notices, Guidance, News Releases, Investor Education)
www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/aml



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

October 23 – 24 | Santa Monica, CA

Managing Third-Party Compliance Vendors: Tips and Effective Practices

Thursday, October 24, 2019

1:45 p.m. – 2:45 p.m.

Establishing a strong third-party risk management program is an important step in mitigating risks. During this session, panelists discuss tips on performing an effective due diligence review and provide advice on evaluating services.

Moderator: Isabel Patel
Surveillance Director, Sales Practice
FINRA San Francisco District Office

Speakers: Sean Abbey
Examination Manager, Sales Practice
FINRA Denver District Office

Melinda LeGaye
President
Moody Securities, LLC

Managing Third-Party Compliance Vendors: Tips and Effective Practices Panelist Bios:

Moderator:

Isabel Patel is Surveillance Director in FINRA's San Francisco District Office. Prior to this role, Ms. Patel was an Examination Manager in the Los Angeles District Office where she supervised complex cases involving a variety of business lines and products. Ms. Patel has worked in financial regulation for almost 20 years, starting out as a regulator at the Nasdaq Stock Market where she helped develop and manage the market's real time trade surveillance system. Ms. Patel received her degree in Economics from George Washington University and works with youth groups at her local church.

Speakers:

Sean Abbey, CFA is Examination Manager in FINRA's Denver District Office and supervises a team of examiners who conduct firm and cause examinations to review for compliance with FINRA and SEC rules. Mr. Abbey has been with FINRA for more than eight years and previously worked as an Examination Manager and Examiner in FINRA's San Francisco District Office. Prior to joining FINRA, Mr. Abbey worked for the U.S. Treasury Department examining national banks. Mr. Abbey is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), completed the Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional™ program from the FINRA Institute at Wharton, and graduated from Colorado State University with a Bachelor's degree in Finance.

Melinda (Mimi) G. LeGaye serves as President of both Moody Securities, LLC and MGL Consulting, LLC. Ms. LeGaye has more than 30 years' experience representing the interests of small broker-dealers having held the positions of president, CCO and FINOP for several small broker-dealers over the years. She currently serves as President and CCO of Moody Securities, LLC and as FINOP and a registered representative for Silver Portal Capital, LLC. Ms. LeGaye also serves as a Small Firm Member on FINRA's District 6 Committee. Prior to forming MGL, Ms. LeGaye served as CCO of Horne Securities Corp. a broker-dealer which was formed to distribute Reg D private placements of real estate limited partnerships. During the early 1980s to late 1980s, she served on the Regulatory Affairs Committee and as president of the local chapter of the Real Estate Securities & Syndication Institute (RESSI) which was an affiliate of the National Association of Realtors. Ms. LeGaye is actively involved with ADISA (formerly Real Estate Investment Securities Association, aka REISA). As a consultant, Ms. LeGaye has worked primarily with small and mid-size broker-dealers, but she has also worked with many larger broker-dealers providing clearing services to introducing broker-dealers. Having served as president, CCO, FINOP, General Securities Principal, and Municipal Securities Principal for various broker/dealers since the mid 1980's, Ms. LeGaye has worked extensively with retail and institutional broker-dealers, as well as boutique broker-dealers which provide investment banking, mergers & acquisitions advisory services, or which conduct business in the wholesale/retail distribution of Reg D Private Placements, non-traded REITs or 1031 Exchange Programs. As a municipal securities principal, she worked for a small minority enterprise broker-dealer which was involved in municipal bond underwritings, capital raising and financial advisory activities. As President, CCO, FINOP and a small business owner, Ms. LeGaye has first-hand experience and an in-depth understanding of the challenges FINRA small firm members (less than 150 RR's) face on a day to day basis. Ms. LeGaye holds the Series 7, 24, 27, 53, 63, 79 and 99 registrations. She has previously held the Series 22, 39 and 3 registrations as well. She received her BBA from Sam Houston State University. An advocate for small broker-dealers and sensitive to the compliance, operational and regulatory challenges they face, she has spoken at numerous industry seminars and compliance programs over the years on topics ranging from supervision of independent brokers; surveillance using exception reports; compliance testing for small firms; product due diligence; and most recently at the SMARSH 2016 Connect Conference held in December 2016.



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

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Managing Third-Party Compliance Vendors: Tips and Effective Practices



Panelists

■ Moderator

- **Isabel Patel, Surveillance Director, Sales Practice, FINRA San Francisco District Office**

■ Panelists

- **Sean Abbey, Examination Manager, Sales Practice, FINRA Denver District Office**
- **Melinda LeGaye, President, Moody Securities, LLC**

To Access Polling

- Under the “Schedule” icon on the home screen,
- Select the day,
- Choose the Managing Third-Party Compliance Vendors: Tips and Effective Practices session,
- Click on the polling icon:



Polling Question 1

1. How long has your firm been in business?

- a. 0-3 year**
- b. 4-7 years**
- c. 8-10 years**
- d. Over 10 years**

Polling Question 2

- 2. Do you use vendors for any compliance services?**
- a. Yes**
 - b. No**

Polling Question 3

3. What does your firm currently use vendors for?

- a. FinOp Consulting**
- b. Email Retention**
- c. I.T. and Cybersecurity**
- d. Compliance Consulting including Exam Prep and CE**
- e. More than one service**

Topics

- **Do We Need A Vendor?**
- **Vendor Due Diligence – Small Firm Perspective**
- **Common Challenges for Small Firms**
- **Importance of Ongoing Vendor Reviews**
- **FINRA Examinations**
- **Resources**

Do We Need A Vendor?

■ Needs Assessment

- What should you consider when determining your vendor needs

■ Services Vendors are Commonly Used For

- FinOp, Technology, Email and Records Storage, Compliance, CRM Solutions

Vendor Due Diligence

- Vendor should understand your business and regulatory environment
- Cheapest is not always the best solution in the long run.

Due Diligence: Questions to Consider

- How do I find potential vendors for my firm's needs?
- What sort of information should I consider in evaluating the vendor?
- What are key services I should look for?
- Depth of Vendor's internal resources.
- Internal record retention policy
- What are common pitfalls?

Vendor Due Diligence: Tips

- **FinOp Consultant**
- **Email Retention**
- **I.T. and Cybersecurity**
- **Regtech Solutions**
- **AML Compliance**
- **Compliance, Exam Prep and Firm CE**

Polling Question 4

- 4. What have you found to be the Biggest Challenge in finding the right vendor?**
- a. I don't know where to look**
 - b. I don't have time to research**
 - c. I don't have the expertise to evaluate the vendor, that's why I need a vendor!**
 - d. Many are too expensive for my firm's budget**

Common Challenges for Small Firms

- Identifying potential candidates
- Limited Resources: time and money
- Limited Contract Negotiation
- Scaling vendor solutions to your small firm
- Ongoing Assessments: Limited in-house expertise

Ongoing Vendor Reviews

■ My vendor is doing the job already, why do I have to review them again?

- Regulatory Obligations
- Benefits
- Potential Pitfalls
- Practical Considerations

FINRA Examinations

■ What does FINRA look for?

- A list of vendors the firm uses
- Procedures and Controls for vendor outsourcing
- Evidence of reasonable review and supervisory approval

Resources

FINRA Resources

- **FINRA Compliance Vendor Directory**
- **Notice 05-48: Outsourcing**

Additional Resources

- **FDIC FIL-44-2008: Guidance for Managing 3rd-Party Risk**
- **OCC Bulletin 2013-29: Risk Management Guidance**
- **Federal Reserve Board, December 5, 2013: Guidance On Managing Outsourcing Risk**



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1:45 p.m. – 2:45 p.m.

Resources

FINRA Resources

- FINRA Compliance Vendor Directory
www.finra.org/industry/cvd
- *Notice to Members 05-48, Outsourcing, Members' Responsibilities When Outsourcing Activities to Third-Party Service Providers* (July 2005)
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p014735.pdf

Additional Resources

- Federal Reserve Board, Guidance on Managing Outsourcing Risk (December 2013)
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1319a1.pdf
- Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) Bulletin 2013-29 (October 2013)
www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Third-Party Risk: Guidance for Managing Third-Party Risk (June 2008)

Webpage: www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08044.html

PDF link: www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08044.pdf



2019 FINRA Small Firm Conference

October 23 – 24 | Santa Monica, CA

How Small Firms Can Effectively Keep Up to Date with New Regulatory Obligations **Thursday, October 24, 2019** **3:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.**

Join FINRA staff and industry practitioners as they discuss how they track, analyze and implement policies to comply with new rules. Panelists provide practical tips for keeping Written Supervisory Procedures (WSPs) up to date, training staff and testing new procedures.

Moderator: John Veator
Senior Director
FINRA Member Relations and Education

Speakers: S. Kendrick Dunn
Registered Principal
Hamilton Grant, LLC

Chris LeVasseur
Associate District Director, Sales Practice
FINRA Los Angeles District Office

Jessica Pastorino
President and Chief Compliance Officer
M&A Securities Group

How Small Firms Can Effectively Keep Up to Date with New Regulatory Obligations Panelist Bios:

Moderator:

John Veator is Senior Director in FINRA's Office of Member Relations and Education. His duties include advising firms on FINRA initiatives, rules and resources. He also collects feedback from the industry and advocates for changes to FINRA's programs where appropriate. Previously, he was a senior counsel in FINRA's Regulatory Policy Office, where he advised FINRA exam staff on rule interpretations and conducted administrative actions. He was also a senior staff member of FINRA's Registration and Disclosure Department, where he advised on state securities laws and processes. Prior to joining FINRA, Mr. Veator served as the North American Securities Administrators Association's (NASAA) Deputy General Counsel and was NASAA's Acting General Counsel when he left the association to join NASD. Mr. Veator received his bachelor's degree from Colgate University and his JD from Vanderbilt Law School.

Speakers:

S. Kendrick Dunn is a registered principal with Hamilton Grant, LLC, a firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions. He is also President of Jamboree Securities Consulting, which specializes in compliance solutions and management consulting services for broker-dealers. Previously, he served as the Chief Compliance Officer for Pacific Select Distributors, Inc. from 2002-2017 and as an Assistant Vice-President of its parent, Pacific Life Insurance Co., from 2004-2017. At Pacific Life he coordinated policies and implemented operating efficiencies across its five small, mid-sized, and large broker-dealer subsidiaries. He also served on an oversight committee reviewing their operations. Within Pacific Life, he chaired its sales material review committee, which included the review of its investment and variable insurance product advertising. Mr. Dunn began his career in the securities industry with the NASD (n/k/a FINRA) where he spent over eight years in Los Angeles as a member of that district's management. In that role, he managed regulatory examinations, reviewed membership applications and directed cause investigations. Next he spent more than five years working at different times in compliance, administration, human resources and finance with several broker dealers, including a bank-affiliated broker-dealer and two trading and investment banking firms. Mr. Dunn also founded and directed a securities industry consulting firm from 1999-2007. He was a member of FINRA's District 2 Committee from 2009-2012. He currently co-chairs the Speakers Bureau for the Southern California Compliance Group. Mr. Dunn has also served on several other industry boards including the National Association of Independent Broker Dealers. He has held the Series 7, 24, 27, 51 and 63 registrations. Mr. Dunn is a graduate of UCLA with a B.A. in Economics and he holds an M.B.A. in Finance and Consulting Services from USC.

Chris LeVasseur is Associate Director of the FINRA Los Angeles District Office where he is responsible for managing the District Office's regulatory programs. Mr. LeVasseur has been with FINRA/NASD since 1996 and was previously an Examination Manager in the Los Angeles and San Francisco District Offices. Mr. LeVasseur is designated as a Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional™ by the FINRA Institute at Wharton. Mr. LeVasseur graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and Psychology from Lafayette College and a Masters of Business Administration degree from National University.

Jessica Pastorino has been involved in the securities industry since 2006 with a focus on compliance and operations for privately-placed transactions including capital raising and M&A advisory services. As President and Chief Compliance Officer for M&A Securities Group, Ms. Pastorino runs a firm that offers a broker-dealer platform for independent middle-market investment banking professionals and boutique advisory groups. Ms. Pastorino believes in a solution-based approach to compliance challenges. Ms. Pastorino holds her Series 24, 79, 62, 22, 39 and 63 licenses. Ms. Pastorino earned her Bachelor of Arts Degree in English at California State University Long Beach and serves as a member of the FINRA District and FINRA CAP committees.



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How Small Firms Can Effectively Keep Up to Date with New Regulatory Obligations



Panelists

■ Moderator

- **John Veator, Senior Director, FINRA Member Relations and Education**

■ Panelists

- **S. Kendrick Dunn, Registered Principal, Hamilton Grant, LLC**
- **Chris LeVasseur, Associate District Director, Sales Practice, FINRA Los Angeles District Office**
- **Jessica Pastorino, President and Chief Compliance Officer, M&A Securities Group**



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Resources

- FINRA's Website for Compliance Tools
www.finra.org/compliance-tools
- FINRA's Website for Rules and Guidance
www.finra.org/rules-guidance