NASD formed the Mutual Fund Task Force (“Task Force”) to consider issues relating to soft dollars, mutual fund portfolio transaction costs and distribution arrangements. The Task Force was established after discussions between the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and NASD staffs, to provide guidance to the SEC as it considers these issues.1

The Task Force is comprised of senior industry executives who represent broker-dealers and mutual fund management companies, as well as representatives from the academic and legal communities. The Task Force divided its work into two phases. In the first phase, it considered mutual fund portfolio transaction costs, particularly “soft dollar” services and disclosure. On November 11, 2004, the Task Force submitted its Report on these issues to the SEC.2

Immediately following the submission of its Phase One Report, the Task Force commenced its work on Phase Two, which covered distribution arrangements, including fees paid pursuant to Rule 12b-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”) and revenue sharing. This Report presents the results of the Task Force’s deliberations on these issues.

I. Background and Summary of Task Force Recommendations

Mutual fund investors pay for the distribution of fund shares in a number of direct and indirect ways, including front-end, back-end and spread loads paid directly by investors, Rule 12b-1 payments paid from fund assets, and revenue sharing payments made by the fund’s adviser. The adoption of Rule 12b-1 in 1980 and the development of multiple class funds encouraged an array of fee structures. As funds developed new distribution channels, such as fund supermarkets and the retirement market, the number of alternative fee structures increased. Thus, for example, load funds can be offered on a load-waived basis in some markets, “no load” funds may pay service fees to broker-dealers and investment advisers, and multiple class funds offer an increasing number of choices to retail and institutional investors.3


3 A multiple class fund has one portfolio and one investment adviser, but offers more than one class of its shares to investors. Each class represents a similar interest in the mutual fund’s portfolio. The principal difference between the classes is that the investor pays different types of distribution fees depending upon the class chosen.
The Task Force reviewed the history of Rule 12b-1, including the purposes for which it was adopted and the use of the rule by the fund industry. The Task Force also discussed different forms of distribution payments and the extent to which these payments serve a legitimate purpose in the distribution of mutual funds. In particular, the Task Force considered investor understanding of the existence of revenue sharing and differential compensation and the potential conflicts that these payments may present. Finally, the Task Force reviewed the development of multiple class funds and their effect on investor understanding of mutual fund distribution costs.

The Task Force believes that many of the developments in distribution payments since the adoption of Rule 12b-1 have benefited investors by allowing them to choose to pay distribution costs up-front, over time, or when fund shares are redeemed. At the same time, the variety and complexity of these choices, and the fact that many distribution costs are incurred at the fund level, may tend to obscure the extent of these costs and the incentives that they may create.

The Task Force concludes that the most important changes that the Commission should consider are those that make the costs and potential conflicts associated with mutual fund distribution more visible to the retail investor. In the Task Force’s view, the Commission should require that a broker-dealer make available to investors, at the point of sale, a short, easy to understand document that describes the salient features of a fund, including revenue sharing and differential compensation arrangements (the “Profile Plus”). While this disclosure would include fees and expenses and the existence of particular incentives at the dealer level, it also would summarize information about the fund’s investment strategies, risks and other significant features. This disclosure would build upon the Commission’s recent initiatives in this area.4

The Task Force recommends that a broker-dealer be required to provide the Profile Plus on its web site and refer investors to the disclosure, unless an investor opts out of this form of delivery. By referring an investor to a point of sale document on its web site, a broker-dealer could provide disclosure in a timely and comprehensible manner at the point of sale. Web site delivery of the Profile Plus also would provide investors with ready access to additional, more detailed disclosure through hyperlinks to the fund prospectus and a dealer disclosure statement concerning revenue sharing and differential compensation arrangements. Web site delivery would allow investors to compare funds offered by their broker-dealer. By giving investors a short disclosure document with access to further information through hyperlinks, the Profile Plus would allow investors to review as much or as little detail about a fund as may be desired. The Task Force also urges the Commission to issue interpretive guidance providing that an investor’s access to the Profile Plus, the full fund prospectus and the dealer disclosure document through

the Internet would constitute delivery of these documents for purposes of the federal securities laws.

The Task Force’s recommendation of the Profile Plus and the manner in which it should be delivered were guided by the results of in-depth, in-person interviews conducted with individual investors. These interviews indicated a high level of enthusiasm for the information set forth in the Profile Plus, and a preference for web site delivery of the disclosure.5

In addition to its disclosure recommendations, the Task Force recommends that the Commission consider changes in the substantive regulation of mutual fund distribution arrangements. The Task Force recommends that the Securities and Exchange Commission consider the following measures:

• Update and modernize the findings that a fund board must make in approving and continuing a Rule 12b-1 plan;

• List Rule 12b-1 fees in the prospectus fee table solely in a manner that describes their purpose, e.g., as “distribution and shareholder servicing fees,” without reference to a rule number that may be confusing to many investors;

• Mandate better disclosure to investors about the costs of Class B shares and, along with NASD, consider other regulatory issues concerning Class B shares; and


II. Disclosure of Revenue Sharing and Differential Compensation Arrangements

Investors would benefit from better disclosure about mutual fund distribution costs, including revenue sharing and differential compensation arrangements.

Broker-dealers and their registered representatives are compensated for the sale of mutual fund shares in various ways, and the disclosure that investors receive depends upon the

5 To conduct the investor testing, NASD retained Applied Research and Consulting (“ARC”), which conducted the investor interviews in White Plains, New York on February 22, 2005 and Alexandria, Virginia on February 25, 2005. On March 17, 2005 in Bethesda, Maryland, ARC conducted further investor testing of a revised Profile Plus and the new mutual fund point of sale disclosure documents included in the Supplemental Request for Comments. The investors interviewed were not told that one form was designed by NASD for the Task Force and the other by the SEC. A copy of the resulting report (“NASD Investor Report”) is enclosed and posted on NASD’s web site along with a copy of this Report. The Task Force made a number of refinements to the Profile Plus in response to comments and questions received from investors during ARC’s interviews. A number of these changes incorporated aspects of the point of sale disclosure forms proposed in the Supplemental Request for Comment.
particular compensation arrangement. For example, compensation that is deducted from the purchase price or from fund assets, such as sales charges and Rule 12b-1 fees, is disclosed in the fee table that appears in the mutual fund prospectus. Other forms of compensation, such as payments from a mutual fund adviser for “shelf space,” are not disclosed prominently.

- Revenue sharing arrangements occur when an investment adviser agrees to pay a broker-dealer cash compensation not otherwise disclosed in the prospectus fee table. Thus, revenue sharing includes payments for shelf space and marketing support to distribute the investment company’s shares, but does not include payments made to fund intermediaries for services such as sub-accounting for fund shareholders.

- Differential cash compensation arrangements typically occur when a broker-dealer provides higher payouts or similar subsidies to its registered representatives for the sale of certain investment company products, such as investment companies that are proprietary funds of the broker-dealer.

Revenue sharing and differential cash compensation arrangements may create incentives to favor some funds over others inappropriately. These compensation arrangements may encourage broker-dealers and their registered representatives to sell certain funds to maximize their compensation, rather than to best meet their customers’ needs. Thus, they may provide point of sale incentives that could compromise proper customer suitability considerations.

The Task Force recommends that the SEC address these concerns by requiring broker-dealers to disclose these incentives to their customers in a simple, understandable way. Disclosure of revenue sharing and differential cash compensation arrangements would enable investors to ask informed questions and evaluate whether a registered representative’s recommendation may be inappropriately influenced by these arrangements. Disclosure of these arrangements could be an important adjunct to existing suitability, sales practice, and disclosure requirements and may help to ensure that there is an appropriate match between the needs of an investor and the mutual fund in which he or she invests.

The disclosure provided by the Profile Plus will give investors the tools they need to evaluate the potential conflicts of interest that these payments present.

III. Point of Sale Disclosure Through the Profile Plus

In 1998, the Commission adopted significant changes to the disclosure requirements for mutual funds. First, it substantially revised Form N-1A, the mutual fund prospectus, in

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6 The federal securities laws require delivery of a mutual fund prospectus to an investor at or before the time that the investor receives a confirmation statement for the investment. In addition, an investor must be provided with a Statement of Additional Information upon request.
order to simplify its disclosure and put it in “plain English.” The amendments to Form N-1A were designed to focus prospectus disclosure on the features unique to a particular fund, with less emphasis on technical, legal, and operational matters generally common to all funds.

In addition, the Commission adopted Rule 498 under the Securities Act of 1933, which allows funds to deliver a short, simple summary prospectus, called a “profile.” An investor who receives a fund profile may purchase fund shares based on the profile or request the full fund prospectus. In any event, an investor who purchases fund shares based on the profile will receive the fund’s full prospectus with the purchase confirmation. Profiles may be distributed through any means, including direct mail, print media, broadcast, and electronic media.

To date, few mutual funds have used the fund profile in the retail market. One concern that has been voiced about the fund profile is that it could expose funds to unforeseen liability. For example, by summarizing disclosure that appeared in the full prospectus, some fear that the fund profile could be deemed to have omitted material information.

In the Point of Sale Proposal and the Supplemental Request for Comment, the Commission proposed new confirmation and point of sale disclosure requirements for transactions in mutual funds. The proposals are designed to improve the disclosure that investors receive at the point of sale and in transaction confirmations regarding the costs and potential conflicts of interest that arise from the distribution of mutual fund shares.

The Task Force’s recommendations would enhance and build upon the Commission’s proposals and incorporate key concepts of the profile prospectus and the disclosure forms proposed in the Supplemental Request for Comment. The Task Force recommends that the Commission adopt the following measures that would improve mutual fund disclosure:

- First, the Commission should mandate delivery by broker-dealers of a Profile Plus document. We have attached a sample Profile Plus for shares of a Class A equity fund. By mandating delivery of this document, the Commission would ensure that simple, clear disclosure reaches the retail investor. Moreover, Commission-mandated, line item disclosure might alleviate some of the liability issues that flow from voluntary disclosure in a simplified format. The inclusion in the Profile Plus of hyperlinks to the full fund prospectus also should alleviate liability concerns.

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7 See Attachment A. The sample Profile Plus includes hyperlinks to a prototype fund prospectus and a dealer disclosure statement, which an investor may click for further information. Attachment B is a sample prototype prospectus. Attachment C is a sample dealer disclosure statement. For a demonstration of how the Profile Plus and hyperlinks would work for investors, please see: http://apps.nasd.com/prototype/profile_prototype.pdf
Second, disclosure on broker-dealer web sites, with broker-dealers referring investors to this disclosure, generally should be the mode of delivery mandated by the Commission. Web site disclosure provides the best means to provide meaningful disclosure to investors at the time the sale is being made. The Profile Plus would contain hyperlinks to the full fund prospectus and to a dealer disclosure statement. Therefore, web site disclosure would allow an investor to quickly obtain additional information about the risks, investment strategies, dealer-level incentives and other information associated with a particular fund.8 Moreover, web site disclosure would provide an investor with access to similar disclosure for all of the funds that the broker-dealer sells, making comparisons easier.

A. The Profile Plus

The Profile Plus is a two-page, easy to understand document that includes key characteristics of the fund and all fees and expenses of the fund, including the costs and potential conflicts associated with mutual fund distribution.

The following features of the Profile Plus should be highlighted:

- The Profile Plus is, in some ways, broader than the profile permitted by Rule 498. In particular, the Profile Plus would require disclosure by a broker-dealer of revenue sharing and differential compensation arrangements.

- The Profile Plus is, in other ways, less comprehensive than the profile. For example, the Profile Plus does not include information on how to redeem fund shares, how often the fund intends to make distributions, or information about the portfolio manager.

- Page One Disclosure:

  Page one sets forth a brief statement of the fund’s principal investment strategies and principal investment risks, with hyperlinks for more information.

  - Under “How We Invest,” an investor would receive information about the fund’s principal investment strategies, with a hyperlink to the relevant section of the fund prospectus for more information.

  - Under “Risks to You,” an investor would receive information about the fund’s principal investment risks, again with a hyperlink to the relevant section of the fund prospectus for more information.

8 See NASD Investor Report at 4, which states that investors favor a format that allowed them to “click through” for more information if desired.
• Page one also includes a bar chart that shows the fund’s total return for the past ten years, and a chart that shows average annual return of the fund over the past 1-, 5- and 10-year periods.

The Task Force’s decision to include information in addition to mutual fund fees and expenses in the Profile Plus is supported by our investor research. The NASD Investor Report notes that all investors interviewed were interested in the information provided on page one of the Profile Plus regarding the fund’s investment strategies, risks and performance. For example, concerning the risk disclosure investors had the following comments:

- “This is good. It’s common knowledge (i.e., volatility), but it’s scary to see it.”
- “I think the risk factors are explained well.”
- “I think they need to tell you that there is a risk. No surprises there. I would expect this information.”
- “The [SEC form] is missing a couple of key features. I would add the performance and risk information [to the SEC form] and the other basic information about the kind of fund.”
- “I like this [the SEC version]. But [‘Page One’] is important to know. If you forget about [the risks], you could be in a world of trouble.”

The Task Force believes that it is extremely important to include information concerning investment strategies and risks in point of sale disclosure.

• Page Two Disclosure:

Page two highlights the costs associated with fund ownership and possible conflicts of interest.

- The “Fees and Expenses” tables (“You Pay When You Buy” and “You Also Pay Each Year”) show the total fees and expenses paid by a shareholder – both transaction fees and fund operating expenses – based on the fund’s current prospectus. The Profile Plus would present the costs in dollars and percentages, based on $1,000, $50,000 and $100,000 hypothetical investments. Moreover, total fund operating expenses would be presented as a single number, and not broken down into components (e.g., Rule 12b-1 fees, transfer agency fees). In addition, the disclosure of fees based on hypothetical investment amounts is clearer and more helpful to investors than
a presentation of fees based on the customer’s actual investment. Based on the results of the NASD Investor Report, the Task Force believes that investors are interested primarily in the total amount of the fees that they pay, and the effect of these fees on fund performance, rather than in a detailed breakdown of the various components of total fees. Investors likely will not find a breakdown of annual fund expenses either clear or useful. Several interviewed observed that only the total amount was relevant to them as individual investors. Others found the breakdown categories to be vague. Investor comments on a breakdown of fund annual fund expenses into component costs included:

- “It adds up to 1.38%. I already knew that from before. Why should I care about this? It won’t affect how much I’m paying.”
- “What is this ‘other expenses?’ That doesn’t tell me anything.”
- “This is where I tune out. It’s just gobbledygook.”

The attached sample Profile Plus relates to Class A shares of an equity fund. Consequently, we have included only those fees and expenses that pertain to Class A shares. We recommend that the Commission require funds and distributors to include the specific fees and expenses that would apply to a substantial number of their investors in the pertinent class of mutual fund.

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9 The forms accompanying the Supplemental Request for Comment not only provide disclosure with respect to hypothetical investment amounts, but also provide an opportunity for an investor to request disclosure with respect to his or her actual investment. See Supplemental Request for Comment at 10. This “actual investment” disclosure could confuse or mislead investors, particularly with respect to ongoing expenses. Although the proposed forms would provide an “estimated 1\textsuperscript{st} year” amount, and would disclose “This estimate assumes the value of your investment does not change,” many investors likely would believe that the dollar amount presented represents the investor’s actual share of expenses each year, for the life of the investment. In fact, this would rarely be the case, since the value of the investment would change.

In contrast, disclosure based upon the three hypothetical amounts allows the investor to compare the costs of different funds, without imposing the additional expense of actual investment disclosure, and without potentially confusing investors.

If the Commission determines to the contrary, the Task Force believes that the best way to deliver that additional disclosure is by allowing an investor to access an Internet-based calculator that would display the pertinent information after the investor enters his or her actual investment amount. This could be developed as an industry-wide utility, assuring consistency and radically decreasing expenses. Provision of this tool depends on the use of the Internet to deliver the information.

10 Of course, for those investors interested in a breakdown of total fund operating expenses, the Profile Plus allows them to obtain this information easily by clicking through to the appropriate section of the fund prospectus.

shares, such as deferred sales loads with respect to Class B shares and dealer transaction fees (e.g., $25 charge per transaction). In addition, we recommend that the Commission ensure that intermediaries disclose other comparable fees (e.g., wrap account fees charged by investment advisers, and fees charged by broker-dealers in fee-based brokerage accounts). The Profile Plus also provides a hyperlink to the prospectus fee table.

- Page two provides disclosure concerning the availability of breakpoint discounts and a hyperlink to further information. This disclosure would advance one of the goals of the Joint NASD/Industry Task Force on Breakpoints, which was to improve investor understanding of the nature and availability of sales discounts on large investments.

- Page two provides a brief explanation of portfolio transaction costs and portfolio turnover rate. We have revised this section to address investor comments that our earlier proposed disclosure was confusing. A hyperlink would connect an investor to detailed information about the fund’s portfolio transaction costs and portfolio turnover.

- Page two includes a “Potential Conflicts of Interest” section that provides information about revenue sharing and differential compensation arrangements. This disclosure is made through the following two “yes/no” questions that, in the event of a “yes” answer, would include a hyperlink to more information provided by the broker-dealer:

  - **Does the fund or its affiliates pay XYZ Firm extra to promote this Fund over other similar funds?** If the answer to this question is “yes,” an investor may click on a hyperlink to additional information about the revenue sharing payments that the broker-dealer receives. The hyperlinked information would provide an explanation of the nature of

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12 The Profile Plus presents breakpoint disclosure in a manner that makes clear that the discount applies to sales charges only and does not affect an investor’s share of total fund operating expenses. The Task Force respectfully suggests that the breakpoint disclosure included in the forms proposed in the Supplemental Request for Comment may create the mistaken impression that breakpoint discounts apply to all mutual fund fees and expenses, not just mutual fund sales charges.


14 The Phase One Report recommended that the Commission improve the disclosure to fund shareholders of fund trading costs. Specifically, the Task Force recommended that fund prospectuses include a chart covering a five-year period that shows total commissions paid; total commissions paid to affiliates; commissions as a percentage of net asset value; percentage of transaction volume executed on a commission basis; average commission rate per share; and portfolio turnover rate. The website version of our Profile Plus prototype includes a hyperlink to a sample of this disclosure as part of the prototype prospectus.
revenue sharing payments and a ranking of the fund families that make revenue sharing payments to the broker-dealer.¹⁵ (See dealer disclosure statement at Attachment C.)

- **Does XYZ Firm pay its personnel more for selling this Fund than for selling other similar funds?** If the answer to this question is “yes,” an investor may click on a hyperlink to additional information about the differential compensation arrangements that the broker-dealer has with its registered representatives. The hyperlinked information would include an explanation of differential compensation and a ranking of the fund families offered by the broker-dealer.¹⁶ (See dealer disclosure statement at Attachment C.)

**B. Web Site Disclosure**

As discussed above, the Task Force recommends that the Commission require that all broker-dealers provide the Profile Plus, dealer disclosure statement and the fund’s

¹⁵ These internal rankings would list fund families based on the revenue sharing payments received per $1,000 in fund assets held by clients of the broker-dealer and per $1,000 in fund sales made by the broker-dealer.

Attachment 15 to the Supplemental Request for Comment includes the Commission’s proposal for Internet-based disclosure of compensation arrangements as a supplement to point of sale disclosure. *See* Supplemental Request for Comment at 57-59. With respect to revenue sharing, the proposed disclosure includes the rates of revenue sharing payments from the particular fund. The Task Force believes that the ranking information recommended in this Report is critical to investor understanding of the potential conflict of interest presented by revenue sharing. With respect to disclosure of revenue sharing rates, a majority of the Task Force believes that it is inappropriate to publicly disclose this information, thereby disclosing the proprietary financial arrangements of fund families to all others in the industry. Some members of the Task Force, however, preferred rate disclosure.

Attachment 15 also includes disclosure of other payments a broker-dealer receives from a fund family, for transfer agency or recordkeeping services performed. *See id.* at 61-62. The Task Force does not believe that this disclosure should be required, since bona fide performance of, and payment for, these services does not present the same potential conflicts of interest as revenue sharing. Similarly, the Task Force questions the utility of the proposed disclosure in Attachment 15 of “compensation-related conditions.” *See id* at 63-64. In the Task Force’s view, the most important information that may be conveyed through a dealer disclosure document is information that reveals the incentives that a registered representative may have to favor one fund over another offered by the broker-dealer. Disclosure of the fact that the broker-dealer only sells funds that charge sales fees or Rule 12b-1 fees does not advance this objective and may distract investors from other, more pertinent disclosure.

¹⁶ Fund families would be ranked from highest to lowest, based on the payouts to registered representatives for fund sales.

In Attachment 15, the Commission proposes disclosure of differential compensation that is centered on comparison to the “typical” compensation received. *See id.* at 66-68. The Task Force believes that the ranking it recommends is preferable.
prospectus on their web sites.\textsuperscript{17} We recommend that the Commission require that a registered representative either refer the investor to the Profile Plus on the broker-dealer’s web site or e-mail a web site link to the investor. This should occur contemporaneously with a recommendation to an investor that he or she invest in a particular fund. In referring an investor to the disclosure, the registered representative should explain that the Profile Plus contains important information concerning costs and potential conflicts of interest.

Most investors today have ready access to the Internet.\textsuperscript{18} Web site disclosure, as well as the availability of hyperlinks to additional information, will permit each investor to tailor the disclosure according to his own interests and needs. Moreover, web site disclosure would facilitate an investor’s ability to compare different funds.\textsuperscript{19}

In its Supplemental Request for Comment, the Commission observed that a fundamental goal of point of sale disclosure is to provide investors with key information about costs and conflicts contemporaneously with their investment decision.\textsuperscript{20} Web site disclosure would, for most investors, be the simplest and most straightforward way to deliver information to investors quickly and in a format that allows them to easily review as much or as little detail as may be desired.

\textsuperscript{17} We also recommend that direct-sold mutual funds provide the Profile Plus, modified as appropriate, and the fund prospectus on the fund complex web site, so that investors in those funds have access to comparable disclosure.

\textsuperscript{18} The Commission’s recent release concerning the disclosure regime for industrial companies states:

\begin{quote}
“Internet usage in the United States has grown considerably since 2000 when we published our most recent interpretive guidance on the use of electronic media in securities offerings, including with regard to prospectus delivery by electronic means. For example, recent data indicates that 75% of Americans have access to the Internet in their homes, and that those numbers are increasing steadily among all age groups. See, Three out of Four Americans Have Access to the Internet, Nielsen/NetRatings, March 18, 2004; Robyn Greenspan, Senior Surfing Surges, ClickZNetwork, Nov. 20, 2003 (citing statistics from Nielsen/Net Ratings and Jupiter Research). In addition, there is evidence suggesting that the "digital divide" is diminishing. See, for example, Kristen Foundain, Antennas Sprout, and a Bronx Neighborhood Goes Online, The N.Y. Times, June 10, 2004, at G8; Steve Lohr, Libraries Wired, and Reborn, The N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2004 at G1.”
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{19} The ability to deliver the Profile Plus to investors on broker-dealer web sites is fundamental to the Task Force’s support for the development of this new disclosure document. Many Task Force members would not support the Profile Plus absent the ability to deliver the document to investors through the Internet.

\textsuperscript{20} See Supplemental Request for Comment at 28.
As the Commission notes, there are distinct difficulties presented by oral and hard copy delivery requirements. Oral delivery is difficult to monitor and, when information is complex as in the case at hand, hard for investors to digest.\textsuperscript{21} Requiring broker-dealers to provide investors with hard copy disclosure before acceptance of an order may prevent investors from executing telephone orders as quickly as desired.\textsuperscript{22} Web site delivery would avoid these issues and provides investors instantaneous access to information in a format that allows them to review the information at their own pace and level of interest. In discussing mutual fund disclosure reform, Chairman Donaldson indicated recently that the Commission should “examine ways that we can make better use of technology, including the Internet, in our disclosure regime.”\textsuperscript{23} The Task Force respectfully suggests that web site delivery of the Profile Plus would be an important step in this direction.

The NASD Investor Report demonstrates an investor preference for web site delivery. Investors interviewed cited the following reasons for this preference: instant access; ease of comparing the information to other investment options; reduced paper clutter; and the ability to print part – or all – of the document, if desired.\textsuperscript{24} Surveyed investors had the following comments:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{“It is much easier to navigate online than to sit down and read. If I need to I can print it, but a big package mailed to me with all that stuff is too much.”}
  
  \item \textit{“The less paper I get the better. I think e-mail is the way to go.”}
  
  \item \textit{“It is better to read it for yourself, and online is much better. Waiting for mail is archaic.”}
  
  \item \textit{“The more I think about it, the more I’d like to have it online. I’d like to receive an e-mail and then go to the website. Then I can look at the stuff I want to see.”}
\end{itemize}

We respectfully disagree with a conclusion of the Supplemental Request for Comment that “web site disclosure . . . could be ineffective at providing investors with key information about costs and conflicts contemporaneous with investment decisions as point of sale disclosure.”\textsuperscript{25} Web site disclosure – accompanied by the appropriate referral of the investor to the information – is the only mode of delivery that will ensure that

\textsuperscript{21} If the Commission rejects web site delivery, the Task Force supports optional oral delivery as an alternative to required delivery in hard copy. For example, the Commission could allow firms to choose to deliver the required information orally if they have adopted policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that oral disclosure is properly carried out.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Id. at 28-29.}

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{See Remarks before the Mutual Fund and Investment Management Conference, SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, March 14, 2005, Palm Desert, California.}

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{See NASD Investor Report at 17.}

\textsuperscript{25} Supplemental Request for Comment at 28.
investors can obtain the right information at the right time. By giving investors a short
disclosure document with access to further information through hyperlinks, the Profile
Plus would allow investors to review as much or as little detail about a fund as desired
and to easily compare all funds offered by a particular broker-dealer. To the extent that
the Commission is concerned that investors will not actually go to the Profile Plus on the
broker-dealer’s website, that is a matter of investor choice, exactly the same as choosing
not to read hard copy disclosure or not to listen to oral disclosure. The web site mode of
delivery is, in the Task Force’s view, critical to effective and timely disclosure of this
information for the benefit of investors.

Some investors, however, may not have access to the Internet or for other reasons may
not want to obtain this information in electronic form. To address this situation, the Task
Force recommends that the Commission require that broker-dealers offer their customers
the option to elect to receive the Profile Plus and dealer disclosure statement in hard copy
form. If a customer elects hard copy delivery, the Commission should require that the
broker-dealer transmit the Profile Plus and the dealer disclosure statement by e-mail or in
paper form through regular mail or hand-delivery as soon as practicable after the mutual
fund recommendation is made.

C. “Access Equals Delivery”

In November, the Commission proposed rules that would modernize the registration,
communications, and offering processes under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities
Act”). The proposals include reforms to the prospectus delivery requirements under the
Securities Act.

The Securities Act requires delivery of a “final prospectus” meeting the requirements of
Section 10(a) to each investor in a registered offering. A final prospectus must accompany
or precede a written confirmation. Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful to
deliver a security “unless accompanied or preceded” by a final prospectus.

The proposal would modify these prospectus delivery requirements. In particular, the
Commission proposes to adopt an “access equals delivery” approach to prospectus delivery.
Under an “access equals delivery” model, investors would be presumed to have access to the
Internet, and issuers and intermediaries could satisfy their delivery requirements if the filings or
documents are posted on a web site. The access concept is premised on the information or
filings being readily available. Under this model, issuers and broker-dealers can satisfy their
final prospectus delivery obligations if a final prospectus is on file with the Commission within
the required time.

The proposal would not apply to registered investment companies. In this regard, the
Commission notes that funds “are subject to a separate framework and that it would be
more appropriate to consider any changes to our prospectus delivery requirements as they

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26 See Prospectus Delivery Release.

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apply to registered investment companies and business development companies in the
context of a broader reconsideration of this framework.”

The Task Force urges the Commission to apply an “access equals delivery” approach for
the mutual fund prospectus. The Commission should take the position that an investor’s
access to the fund prospectus through the Internet would constitute delivery for purposes
of the federal securities laws. The Commission’s release recognizes the need to
modernize prospectus delivery obligations in view of technological and market structure
developments of recent years. These developments also justify an “access equals
delivery” position with respect to mutual fund prospectuses.

Few firms have used the Rule 498 profile. One issue that has impeded its wider
acceptance has been concern over the potential liability exposure that the profile presents.
For example, a profile summarizes the risks associated with the fund, which are described
in greater detail in the full fund prospectus. By providing two levels of disclosure, the
summary at the time of sale and the more detailed disclosure after the sale has been
executed, the profile system presents an opportunity for litigation over the issue of
whether the profile omitted material information. The fact that the profile is a voluntarily
used document, rather than an SEC-required disclosure document with line item
summaries, may exacerbate this litigation risk.

By mandating the Profile Plus and prescribing the line items of disclosure within the
Profile Plus, the Commission could ameliorate some of these litigation concerns.
Moreover, if the Commission were to adopt an “access equals delivery” approach to the
full prospectus, then for liability purposes an investor would be deemed to have received
the full prospectus on the Internet when he obtains the Profile Plus. This simultaneous
delivery should resolve the existing liability concerns.

D. Responsibility for Information in the Profile Plus

The Task Force urges the Commission to carefully delineate the respective
responsibilities of funds and broker-dealers to provide various items of information to be
included in the Profile Plus. In this regard, it will be important for the fund management
companies and broker-dealers to work with NASD to develop common industry practices
for the prompt delivery of information for inclusion in the Profile Plus. A broker-dealer
should be able to rely in good faith on information included in the Profile Plus that is
provided to the firm by a fund management company. Further, a fund manager should
be permitted to transmit information for inclusion in the Profile Plus as part of its regular
schedule for updating fund prospectuses. Otherwise, inconsistencies between the
Profile Plus and the fund prospectus inadvertently may occur, to the detriment of
effective disclosure.

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28 A fund must keep its prospectus current, updating financial and other information on a periodic basis.
A fund typically sends shareholders an updated prospectus annually.

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E. Disclosure In Other Distribution Channels

Mutual funds are distributed not only by broker-dealers, but also by other intermediaries, including banks, investment advisers, and retirement plan sponsors. Distribution through these channels presents many of the same concerns about fee disclosure and sales incentives as distribution through broker-dealers or directly from the fund. For example, investment advisers who recommend mutual funds may receive a service fee from the mutual fund sponsor and may impose their own “wrap” or other advisory fees. Investors in the defined contribution market do not always receive adequate information concerning their underlying mutual fund investment choices. Clear disclosure at the point of sale concerning the fees, investment strategies, risks, and other information associated with the purchase, as well as disclosure concerning the intermediaries’ own potential conflicts of interest, would benefit investors in these other distribution channels.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission require that other regulated intermediaries provide investors with a disclosure document similar to the Profile Plus at the point of sale. In addition, the Task Force recommends that the Commission work with other agencies, including the Department of Labor, toward a common goal of ensuring that all intermediaries provide point-of-sale information that will help investors reach an informed investment decision.

IV. Substantive Changes in the Regulation of Mutual Fund Distribution Payments

As noted above, the substantive regulatory scheme for mutual fund distribution payments is fundamentally sound, and improved disclosure at point of sale is the most important change that the Commission should consider. The Task Force has the following additional observations regarding substantive regulation of mutual fund distribution payments.

A. Deducting Rule 12b-1 Fees at the Shareholder Account Level

In 2004, the Commission issued a release seeking public comment on ways to improve Rule 12b-1. The Release seeks comment on whether the rule should be rescinded or amended to provide that funds may deduct distribution-related costs directly from shareholder accounts, but not from fund assets.

29 SEC Rel. No. IC-26356 (Feb. 24, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 9726 (March 1, 2004) (the “Rule 12b-1 Release”). A 2001 SEC staff report on mutual fund fees and expenses noted some of the staff’s concerns with Rule 12b-1. Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses (January 10, 2001). The staff report recommended that the Commission consider whether it would be appropriate to review the requirements of Rule 12b-1. The report notes that modifications may be needed to reflect changes in the manner in which funds are marketed and distributed and the experience gained from observing how Rule 12b-1 has operated since it was adopted in 1980. The rule essentially encourages fund directors to view a fund’s 12b-1 plan as a temporary measure even in situations where the fund’s existing distribution arrangements would collapse if the Rule 12b-1 plan were terminated. Under the rule, fund directors must annually approve any Rule 12b-1 plan that will extend for more than one year.
Proponents assert that account-level fees would allow an investor to pay distribution costs over time, but would be more transparent to the customer than fund-level expenses such as Rule 12b-1 fees and revenue sharing payments. Nevertheless, the conversion of Rule 12b-1 fees from the fund level to the shareholder account level would require costly systems changes by fund distributors, transfer agents and intermediaries. Moreover, it is unclear where this approach would leave directly distributed funds that today pay their distribution costs out of fund assets.  

A simpler way to make all fund fees and expenses transparent — including the costs of distribution — would be to mandate better point of sale disclosure to the investor. The Task Force’s recommended Profile Plus would accomplish this objective.

B. Updating the Requirements of Rule 12b-1

The Rule 12b-1 Release states, “[t]he current practice of using 12b-1 fees as a substitute for a sales load is a substantial departure from the use of the rule as envisioned by the Commission when we adopted the rule in 1980.” In this regard, the Task Force urges the Commission to review the provisions of the rule, particularly its procedural requirements, with a view to whether the requirements should be modernized. For example, some suggest that the factors set forth in the Commission release adopting Rule 12b-1 no longer provide helpful guidance to independent directors in determining whether to adopt or continue a Rule 12b-1 plan. Moreover, it appears unnecessary for directors to make quarterly findings as to continuing benefits to the fund and its shareholders in connection with the continuation of existing plans, as currently required.
by Rule 12b-1(e). Rather, the board should annually review continuation of the plan, and in doing so focus on specific concerns, such as whether the plan or portion thereof will continue with respect to a fund that has been closed to new investors.

C. Prospectus Fee Table Disclosure of Rule 12b-1 Fees

The prospectus fee table is a key source of information for investors about mutual fund fees and expenses. Rule 12b-1 fees are listed in the fee table as “Distribution [and/or Service] (Rule 12b-1) fees,” a label that likely is meaningless to many retail investors. The Task Force suggests that it would be helpful to investors if Rule 12b-1 fees were listed in the prospectus fee table solely in a manner that describes their purpose, i.e., as “distribution and shareholder servicing fees,” without reference to a rule number that may be meaningless and confusing to most investors.

D. Class B Shares

A single mutual fund, with one portfolio and one investment adviser, may offer more than one class of its shares to investors. Each class represents a similar interest in the mutual fund’s portfolio. The principal difference between the classes is that the mutual fund charges different types of distribution fees depending upon the class chosen.

Funds distributed through intermediary channels frequently offer investors at least three classes of shares – A, B, and C.\(^ {34} \) Class A shares typically charge a front-end sales charge. When they also impose an asset-based sales charge, it generally is lower than the asset-based sales charge imposed by the other classes. Class B shares typically do not charge a front-end sales charge. Instead, they impose Rule 12b-1 fees that are greater than those of Class A shares, as well as a contingent deferred sales charge (CDSC) that is paid if shares are redeemed within a certain period of time. The CDSC normally declines and eventually is eliminated after a specified number of years. Once the CDSC is eliminated, Class B shares often convert into Class A shares. Upon conversion, the shares will charge the asset-based sales charge of Class A shares.

Rather than charging a front-end load, Class C shares typically impose higher asset-based sales charges than Class A shares. Since their shares generally do not convert into Class A shares, their asset-based sales charge will not be reduced over time. Class C shares often impose a small CDSC if the investor sells his shares within a short time of purchase, usually one year.

Many factors affect whether a particular share class may be appropriate for a particular investor. These factors may include the length of time the investor expects to hold the

\(^ {34} \) Although the use of Class A, B, and C shares is common in intermediary channels, some intermediaries do not offer all three classes of shares or may offer other share classes depending on the circumstances. The discussion in the text above reflects the more common situation where an intermediary distributes Class A, B, and C shares, and not situations in which other classes or combinations of classes may be offered.
shares, the size of the investment, whether the investor is eligible for a breakpoint discount, and the expenses charged by each class. In particular, an investor purchasing Class B or C shares cannot take advantage of breakpoint discounts available on large purchases of Class A shares.

The sale of Class B shares has been the subject of regulatory scrutiny in recent years, resulting in a number of enforcement actions. One way to address these concerns is to provide better disclosure to investors of the costs of a Class B share investment. While the attached prototype Profile Plus concerns Class A shares, we also recommend that the Commission require a Profile Plus for every class. Requiring delivery of the Profile Plus for Class B shares, as with the other classes, would make the fees and expenses more transparent to the investor and would facilitate a comparison of those fees between classes and funds. In particular, the Profile Plus for Class B shares should present the annual, total fund operating expenses (which would include the Rule 12b-1 fee) and the maximum contingent deferred sales load. Both should be presented in dollar amounts, based upon $1,000, $50,000 and $100,000 hypothetical investments. The broker-dealer disclosure should describe the dollar amounts of the total fund operating expenses and the CDSC that are retained by the mutual fund and the dollar amounts that are paid to the broker-dealer.

In addition, the Task Force identified the following areas that may be appropriate for regulatory consideration:

- **Limitations on the length of time before a holding of Class B shares convert to A shares.** The higher Rule 12b-1 fees associated with Class B shares generally permit a mutual fund distributor to recoup the up-front distribution costs that it has incurred. The Task Force does not believe that a mutual fund should continue to charge an investor the higher Rule 12b-1 fees after it has recouped its up-front distribution costs. Regulatory guidance on when conversion from Class B to Class A shares should take place may be appropriate.

- **Guidance on when a closed fund may no longer charge distribution related Rule 12b-1 fees.** When a mutual fund closes to new investors, it may continue to charge Rule 12b-1 fees in order to recoup its up-front distribution costs, or to support the continued bank financing of those costs. It also is appropriate for a closed fund to continue to charge Rule 12b-1 fees if the fees are charged for shareholder servicing or ongoing advice to existing fund shareholders. It is inappropriate for a closed fund to charge Rule 12b-1 fees or distribution-related

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35 This issue generally affects Class B shareholders only. Class A shares typically pay a Rule 12b-1 fee for shareholder servicing only, and Class C shareholders may pay a Rule 12b-1 fee that covers ongoing, well-defined advisory services. Neither of these payments should be affected if the fund closes to new investors. For example, service fees, which may not exceed .25% of the fund’s average net asset value under NASD Rule 2830, are intended to pay for personal service and the maintenance of existing shareholder accounts.
expenses in other circumstances, and regulatory guidance on this issue may be needed.

- **Possible limitations on the size of cumulative Class B sales, and guidance concerning the mutual fund sponsor’s responsibility to police these limitations.** The principal enforcement issue associated with the sale of Class B shares has concerned the availability of Class A breakpoints that would have provided a lower-cost alternative to the investor. Many funds and broker-dealers have established their own limitations on the size of Class B share sales that they will accept. The Task Force recommends that the Commission and NASD consider providing guidance on this issue, including placing limitations on the size of cumulative Class B share sales. In addition, the Commission and NASD may wish to provide guidance on the extent to which the mutual fund distributor must monitor for compliance with any limitations that the Commission might establish, and the procedures that the distributor should adopt to make this monitoring most successful.  

**E. Unified Fee Funds**

The Task Force recommends that the SEC reexamine the unified fee investment company (“UFIC”) concepts that were set forth in the Protecting Investors Report and considered by Congress in the mid-1990s. A UFIC structure should be permitted as an option under mutual fund regulation. This would allow fund investors to choose to invest in a UFIC if they considered its fee structure to be an attractive alternative to traditional fee structures.

A UFIC would be a new type of investment company structure under which all fund expenses would be paid out of a single fee, with no separate sale charges or redemption fees. This single fee could be prominently disclosed to investors, which would allow a fund and investors to understand the fund’s costs without having to analyze various components of the total cost. The proposed single fee structure could facilitate cost comparisons among funds, which, in turn, could increase competition and place downward pressure on fee levels. Under a UFIC approach, Rule 12b-1 would no longer be necessary. Instead, “unconscionable or grossly excessive” unified fees would be prohibited.

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36 Mutual fund advisers, of course, cannot monitor the suitability of share class investments, except with regard to size limitations.

37 The UFIC model was considered as part of the Investment Company Act Amendments of 1995, H.R. 1495, 104th Sess, Sec. 6 (1995). H.R. 1495 was not enacted. The following year, Congress enacted the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. Law 290, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), which made a number of major changes to the Investment Company Act.

38 Some funds already have a type of “unified fee” structure, in which the fund adviser pays all or most of the fund’s expenses, including distribution expenses, directly out of the management fee. These fee structures do not include Rule 12b-1 fees or sales charges.
As envisioned by the 1995 legislation, a UFIC generally would have the same corporate structure as that of a typical mutual fund, including a board of directors. The fee would be set by the fund’s investment manager, which could impose no additional sales charges or other fees. To make investors aware of the fee paid in connection with their UFIC investment, the legislation would have required the fee to be prominently disclosed on the cover of the fund’s prospectus. The fee could not be changed more frequently than annually and only upon adequate notice to shareholders. In addition, to provide a check on the amount of the unified fee and the manager’s control over the UFIC’s operations, the legislation would require at least two-thirds of a UFIC’s board of directors to be independent. The directors would be responsible for approving the management contract and other key service arrangements.

V. CONCLUSION

Mutual fund distribution practices and costs present very important policy issues. The Task Force commends the Commission for addressing these issues and believes that the most important changes that the Commission can undertake are those that would improve the disclosure that investors receive, at point of sale, about the total costs of fund ownership and the potential conflicts that may affect a broker-dealer’s recommendation. The Task Force greatly appreciates the opportunity to present its views on possible ways to address some of these issues. The Task Force and its members stand ready to help in any way that they can as the SEC and its staff proceed in addressing these important matters.